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Majority-Minority Relations in Canadian Corporation Law:
An Overview
Philip Anisman*

The treatment of majority-minority relations in Canadian corporate law

during the last century reflects a movement from a strong application
of the principle of majority rule to an emphasis on protection of minority
interests on the basis of apprehended notions of "fairness." While both
approaches to the resolution of intracorporate conflicts involve a balance

between the interests of majority and minority shareholders, this change
of emphasis has resulted in enhancement of the avenues available for
challenge of corporate conduct by minority shareholders whether the
matter relates to corporate contracts, alteration of a corporation's constitution, removal of shareholders or the standards by which such actions
are evaluated. These questions emphasize the conflict of interest invariably found on the part of a majority shareholder when a transaction or

course of conduct results in a peculiar benefit to the majority or some
other form of differential treatment of the minority.
Canadian law has been influenced by its English forebears.1 This

paper discusses the treatment of majority-minority relations in Canadian

common law, which derives largely from English law,2 and describes a
* Barrister and Solicitor, Toronto. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the
Conference on Comparative Corporation Law sponsored by the Canada-United States Law Institute
in Cleveland, Ohio, in October 1984. This Article was originally published in the CanadianBusiness
Law JournaL See P. Anisman, "Majority-Minority Relations in Canadian Corporate Law: An
Overview" (1986-87) 12 Can. Bus. L.L 473.
1 See generally B. Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law, Hamlyn Lectures, 21st Series (London, Ont.: Stevens & Sons, 1969). For a recent summary of the process of reception of the
common law into Canada, see P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 21-36.
2 The continuing influence of English courts on Canadian decisions was likely attributable in
part to the fact that the Privy Council, in England, remained the final court of appeal from Canadian
courts until 1949; see Hogg, supra, note 1, at 166-68. Thus, although the corporations Acts in the
major commercial provinces in Canada were based on United States legislation, primarily New
York's, English decisions provided the primary precedents for their interpretation. On the history of
these statutes, see generally F.E. Labrie and E.E. Palmer, "The Pre-Confederation History of Corporations in Canada" in J.S. Ziegel, ed., Studies in Canadian Company Law, vol. 1 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 33; R.C.B. Risk, "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario" (1973) 23 U. Toronto L.J. 270. These so-called "letters patent" Acts were
adopted in five provinces and by the Government of Canada; the remaining five provinces followed
the English Companies Acts of various vintages; see, eg., E.E. Palmer, "Federalism and Uniformity
of Laws: The Canadian Experience" (1965) 30 L. & Contemp. Probs. 250. The recent round of
reform relating to corporations legislation in Canada was initiated by the enactment in 1975 of the
CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct ("CBCA") S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33, which was, once again, influ-
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pervasive shift in emphasis from the turn of the century to the present
day.
The traditional notion of majority rule in early English case law was

premised on enabling legislation which treated the corporate constitution

as a contract.3 It was designed to give the majority shareholders, as the
majority owners of the corporation, as much flexibility as possible to determine the policy of the corporation and to oversee the manner in which
it carried on business, even where an adverse effect on the minority was
the consequence.
The direction in Canada, primarily in the last twenty years, has been

toward greater egalitarianism, emphasizing notions of fairness to minority shareholders in determining the balance to be drawn between majority and minority interests. This movement is seen not only in recently
enacted corporations statutes4 and in case law,5 but also in the efforts of
provincial securities commissions and particularly the Ontario Securities
Commission.6 It has affected the standards applicable to the conduct of
majority shareholders in carrying on their corporation's affairs and the
remedies available to minority shareholders for enforcing those standards
in the event of a conflict.

The obvious starting point for an analysis of majority-minority relations in Canadian corporate law is the North-West Transportation Co.
Ltd. v. Beatty7 decision, a case in which the majority shareholder sold to
his own corporation an asset that the corporation needed and ratified the
corporation's purchase of the asset by voting his shares. The minority
dissented from the ratification and sued. The Privy Council treated the
purchase as a question of business policy and held that it was for the
enced by statutes in the United States; see R.W.V. Dickerson et at, Proposalsfor a New Business
CorporationsLaw for Canada, vols. I & 2 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). The CBCA has
been followed in at least six provinces: Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Ontario, New Brunswick
and Saskatchewan, and has influenced amendments to the Nova Scotia Companies Act.
3 See, eg., L.C.B. Gower et at, Gower's PrinciplesofModern Company Law, 4th ed. (London,
Ont.: Stevens & Sons, 1979) at 315-18. See now Companies Act 1985 (U.K.), c. 6, s. 14.
4 See, eg., CBCA, supra, note 2 at ss. 232-34; OntarioBusiness CorporationsAct ("OBCA") S.O.
1982, c. 4, ss. 188-90 & ss. 245-47. See also supra, note 3.
5 See, e.g., Diligentiv. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd. (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C. in Chambers); Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp. (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 718, 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Ferguson cited to D.L.R.].
6 See, eg., Ontario Security Commission ("O.S.C.") Policy 9.1, 3 Can. See. L. Rep. (CCH),
para. 471-901 (1984) ("going private transactions, issuer bids and insider bids"). The securities market in Canada is regulated directly only at the provincial level. There is as yet no federal regulatory
agency with jurisdiction over securities markets and transactions, despite recurring recommendations that one be created and despite the internationalization of securities markets. For an evaluation of the techniques adopted by the provincial commissions in attempts to develop a national
regulatory system, see P. Anisman, "The Regulation of the Securities Market and the Harmonization of Provincial Laws" in R.C.C. Cuning, ed., Harmonizationof Business Law in Canada,vol. 56
of The Collected Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 77.
7 (1887), 12 A.C. 589 (P.C.).
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majority to vote upon and that the majority owed no fiduciary obligation
to the minority in such matters. It concluded that it would not interfere
in matters of internal management.8 (English courts, in fact, tended to
hold that they lacked jurisdiction to do so.')
The Beatty decision was confirmed, shortly thereafter, in another
case in which a majority shareholder purchased an asset and ratified its
sale to his own corporation at three times the value of the purchase.1 0
When a shareholder brought an action to challenge that transaction, the
Privy Council held that no derivative action was available, based on the
English rule in Foss v. Harbottle," because the transaction was ratifiable
in that the majority shareholder could vote his shares to affirm the

contract. 12
Even in the earlier cases, however, the majority could not do anything they wished. The English courts limited the conduct which a majority could vote to ratify, and which a shareholder could therefore not
challenge, to transactions which were neither oppressive nor fraudulent
to the corporation. 3 But oppression and fraud were defined very narrowly, basically in terms of theft from the corporation.1 4
The first of two cases that are prototypical is Cook v. Deeks,"5 in
which the majority shareholders in a closely held corporation, after a
falling out with the minority, simply created a new corporation and used
their corporate contacts to take a contract that would otherwise have
gone to the former corporation. 6 The second case is one in which the
majority wound up a subsidiary corporation to enable the parent to benefit from entering into a transaction that the subsidiary otherwise would
have controlled.17 The difficulty with these early English cases, without
attempting an exegetical analysis, is in drawing the line between what is
oppressive, or ratifiable, and what is not. This question can be quite controversial; the writers differ on it 8 (and it is fair to say that the interpre8 Ibid. at 601.
9 See, eg., Burland v. Earle (1901), [1902] A.C. 83 at 93 (P.C.); Dominon Cotton Mills Co. v.
Amyot (1912), [1912] 4 D.L.R1 306 at 309, [1912] A.C. 546 at 551-52 (P.C.).
10 Burland v. Earle, ibid.
11 (1843), 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R. 189 (Ch.).
12 Burland v. Earle, supra, note 9.
13 Ibid. See also, e.g., F.W. Wegenast, The Law of CanadianCompanies (Toronto: Burroughs,
1931) at 315-17.
14 See, e.g., Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874), L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350; Cook v. Deeks
(1916), 27 D.L.R. 1, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.).
15 Cook v. Deeks, ibid.
16 The decision, involving a corporation with three shareholders, treated a corporate opportunity as an asset of the corporation, the deprivation of which could not be ratified. It arguably remained the leading authority on the corporate opportunity doctrine in Canada until 1973; see now
CanadianAero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, [1974] S.C.R. 592.
17 See Menier v. Hooperh; Telegraph Works supra, note 14.
18 Compare, e.g., S.M. Beck, "An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle" in J.S. Ziegel, ed., Studies in
Canadian Company Law, vol. I (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 545 at 572-81 with Gower, supra,
note 3 at 617-18.
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tation in this paper has not been universally adopted).
The Beatty court pointed out that the contract was reasonable, 19 and
20
some commentators, including the writer of the leading Canadian text,
have interpreted the decision as limited to transactions which are reasonable or fair to the corporation. 2 1 That is one way of attempting to reconcile the notion of oppression with that of majority rule. However they
are read, these cases indicated that a very broad flexibility was to be
given to majority shareholders to control the policy of their corporation,
short of actually removing assets. The courts did not attempt to reconcile the doctrines governing majority contracts and corporate opportunities. In Beatty, for example, the majority shareholder set the price of the
asset purchased without an evaluation and took a profit.2 2 There was no
basis for assessing whether the profit was reasonable. In effect, the majority shareholder set his own price and his own profit, which arguably
meant he was taking assets out of the corporation to the same degree as
another majority shareholder would by diverting a corporate opportunity. The English common law, however, did not recognize this
difficulty.2 3
The complementary element was that a majority shareholder owed
no fiduciary obligation to the minority, a notion that still pervades Commonwealth common law.24 It applies not only to transactions with the
corporation but also in the context of amendments to the corporate constitution.2 5 But this imbalance has begun to be redressed, particularly in
the past twenty years. Recently, the Ontario courts have moved toward
the imposition of a fiduciary obligation owed by majority shareholders to
19 Supra, note 7 at 600.
20 See Wegenast, supra, note 13 at 318.
21 The reasoning in the decision, however, was not premised on this finding and the subsequent
decision of Burland v. Earle,supra, note 9, did not so read it. These cases have generally been read,
therefore, as authorizing a majority shareholder to ratify a transaction between himself and his corporation unless the transaction is fraudulent or oppressive; see, eg., A.J. Macintosh, "Corporate
Governance and Minority Rights" (1983) 7 Dalhousie L.J. No. 3, 42 at 59-61. The price may,
however, be relevant to this question; see, eg., Gray v. Yellowknife Gold Mines Ltd. and Bear Exploration & Radium Ltd. (No. 1) (1947), [1948] 1 D.L.R. 473 at 479, [1947] O.R. 928 at 942 (C.A.),
Robertson C.J. [hereinafter Gray cited to D.L.R.]; see also S.M. Beck, "The Shareholders' Derivative Action" (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 159 at 201.
22 Compare the analysis of the facts in Beatty, supra,note 7 at 594-600 with the Supreme Court
of Canada's account in Beatty v. North-West TransportationCo. Ltd. (1885), 12 S.C.R. 598.
23 See, e.g., Gray, supra, note 21 at 479; where Robertson C.J. characterized a purchase of an
asset from a corporation by its majority shareholder as a misappropriation of corporate property.
See also D.A. Soberman, "Letter to the Editor" (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 225.
Similar difficulties of reconciliation of judicial doctrine exist with respect to corporate opportunities; compare, eg., Cook v. Deeks, supra, note 14 with Regal (Hastings)Ltd. v. Gulliver (1942),
[1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.); and see, ag., Gower, supra, note 3 at 617-19.
24 See, eg., Esplanade Developments Ltd. v. Dinive Holding Pty. Ltd. (1980), 4 A.C.L.R. 826
(W.A.S.C.); Bell v. Source Data ControlLtd. (1986), 39 A.C.W.S. (2d) 62 (Ont. H.C.), Eberle J. See
also, eg., Wegenast, supra, note 13 at 316.
25 See, eg., Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. (1900), [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.); Greenhalgh
v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd. (1950), [1951] 1 Ch. 286 (C.A.).
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the minority, in the context of false proxy circulars,26 and also in the
context of the Ontario statutory follow-up offer requirement.17 The English courts have also begun to erode the strong majority principle. In
Clemens v. Clemens Bros.,2 8 for example, the court imposed a duty on
the majority to act fairly to the minority in amending the corporate

constitution.
The balance has also been redressed through statutory provisions.
Since 1948 there have been a series of attempts to create an effective statutory oppression remedy,29 and in the recent round of corporate law reform in Canada, a very broad oppression remedy has been adopted."
While the following outline of these provisions emphasizes their breadth,
it should be stressed that many of the issues have yet to be determined in
Canada, for there has not been a great volume of litigation under the

relatively new statutes.
26 See, ag., Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill (1973), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 672 at 680, 7 O.R. (2d) 216 at
224 (C.A.); see also Re RJ.Jowsey Mining Co. Ltd. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 104-05, [1969] 2
O.R. 549 at 556-57 (C.A.) (dictum); but see Wotherspoon v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1982), 129
D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 44, 35 O.R. (2d) 449 at 489 (C.A.). The movement toward the imposition of a
fiduciary obligation in the context of insider trading has been similarly halting; see, eg., P. Anisman,
Insider TradingLegislationfor Australia: An Outlineof the Issues andAlternatives (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986) at 30-31; see also Bell v. Source Data Control Ltd.,
supra, note 24.
27 See Re McLaughlin and S.B. McLaughlin Associates Ltd. (1981), 14 B.L.R. 46 (O.S.C.), aff'd
(1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 256 (Ont. Div. Ct), leave to appeal denied 2 O.S.C. Bull. 408C (Ont. C.A.).
McLaughlin was denied an exemption from the follow-up offer obligation even though he controlled
the "offeree" corporation prior to purchasing shares at a premium from two shareholders; the
purchases brought his holdings from just under 53% to almost 58% of the outstanding shares on an
undiluted basis and from 49.6% to 54.3% on a fully diluted basis. The commission treated the
follow-up obligation in the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, s. 91(1), as imposing an
obligation on a controlling shareholder to act evenhandedly toward the minority: see 14 B.L.R. 46
at 62. The follow-up offer requirement under the OntarioSecuritiesAct is discussed in B. Bailey and
P. Crawford, "The Take-Over Bid by Private Agreement: The Follow-Up Offer Obligation" (1983)
7 Dalhousie L.J. No. 3, 93; Report of the Canadian Securities Laws Subcommittee of the State
Regulation of Securities Committee of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association: CanadianSecuritiesLegislation and the Sale of Control (1982) (available
from the American Bar Association). The follow-up offer obligation has been repealed. An offeror
must now make a take-over bid to all shareholders of an offeree corporation in circumstances which
previously would have required a follow-up offer to be made to them: see Ontario Securities Act,
ibid. at s. 92(l)(c), added by S.O. 1987, c. 7, s. 8, which received royal assent on February 12, 1987,
but has not yet come into force.
28 (1976), [1976] 2 All E.R. 268 (Ch.).
29 See, eg., Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, 1945, U.K. Cmd. 6659,
para. 60 ("Cohen Report"); Report of the Company Law Committee, 1962, Crnd. 1749, paras. 20012 ("Jenkins Report") (discussing Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.), c. 38, s. 210). A new oppression
remedy was finally enacted in the Companies Act 1980 (U.K.), c. 22, s. 75; see now Companies Act
1985 (U.K.), c. 6, ss. 459-61.
30 See, e-g., CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 234; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 247. The new oppression
remedy in these statutes derives from Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 2, s. 19.04 (Draft of
CBCA); see also ibid. at vol. 1, paras. 485-86 (Commentary). See also S.M. Beck, "Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980s" in Law Society of Upper Canada, CorporateLaw in the 80s (Don Mills:
DeBoo, 1982) 311 at 312.
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The statutory oppression standard is found in section 247 of the
OBCA. It provides that a shareholder may obtain a remedy from a court
whenever the business of a corporation or its affiliates is carried on in a
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any shareholder. It obviously includes minority
shareholders 31 and is likely to be interpreted quite liberally.32 It opens
up many issues that have been treated in U.S. cases as involving the fiduciary obligation of majority to minority shareholders, although Canada
may address them in a different way.
Section 247 moves the balance away from a largely unfettered freedom of the majority to do as they like in running the corporation, by
imposing on them a duty to act fairly on behalf of all of the shareholders. 33 It enables minority shareholders to bypass the traditional rule in
Foss v. Harbottle, which had precluded derivative actions on behalf of the
corporation where an act was ratifiable, 34 by giving them a direct action
for relief; they need not sue on behalf of the corporation. (Derivative
actions too are made more readily available. 35 ) Further, the statutes now
tend to eliminate the rule concerning ratifiable transactions that existed
at common law.36
What are some of the different types of conduct to which these standards have been applied? Perhaps the most obvious, in view of the exam31 One court has held that the provision protects only minority shareholders and therefore
denied standing under the provision to a holder of 50% of a corporation's shares in a deadlock
position; see Vedova v. Garden House Inn Ltd. (1985), 29 B.L.R. 236 (Ont. H.C.); but see Re
Gandalman Investments Ina andFogle (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 638, 52 O.R. (2d) 614 (Ont. H.C.).
The provision grants the same protection to directors, officers, holders of securities other than
shares, and to creditors. A creditor who is not a security holder, however, requires approval of a
court to invoke the section; see, eg., OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 244(b)(iii) ("complainant" includes a
person "who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an application"). See, e.g., R.
v. Sands Motor Hotel Ltd. (1984), [1985] 1 W.W.R. 59, 84 D.T.C. 6464 (Sask. Q.B.) (Crown had
standing as creditor); Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd. (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C. in
Chambers) (shareholder, director and officer); but see Re Cucci's RestaurantLtd. (1985), 29 B.L.R.
196 (Alta. Q.B.).
32 See, eg., Ferguson, supra, note 5.
33 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. ofNew England,Inc. (1975), 367 Mass. 578, 328
N.E.2d 505; Baker v. CommercialBody Builders, Ina (1973), 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387; Jones v.
H. Ahmanson & Co. (1969), 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464 (fiduciary duties). See also Dickerson et
al., supra, note 2 at vol. 1, para. 487.
34 See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 232; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 245. The statutes establish
a procedure requiring judicial approval to initiate a derivative action; a court must be satisfied that
the directors will not have the corporation bring the action, that the plaintiff is acting in good faith,
and that the action is in the corporation's interest. See also Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 2, s.
19.02 & vol. 1, paras. 481-82. Compare Wallersteinerv. Moir (No. 2) (1975), [1975] Q.B. 373 (C.A.);
and see Daniels v. Daniels (1977), [1978] Ch. 406.
36 See, e.g., CBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 235(1); OBCA, supra,note 4 at s. 248(1). See also Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 2, s. 19.05(1) & vol. 1, para. 487 ("abrogates that aspect of the rule in
Foss v. Harbottlethat bars a shareholder from complaining of alleged misconduct on the ground that
the impugned act might be authorized or ratified at a meeting of shareholders").
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ples above, is an interested transaction, a contract between the
corporation and a majority shareholder. Both the courts and the legislatures are giving minority shareholders greater protection against the majority in this context. Even where an interested director's transaction is
ratified by the majority shareholder, Canadian courts have begun to
move away from the approach in Beatty.3 7 In two recent decisions,
transactions entered into by a corporation, which would have benefited
the majority shareholders exclusively (by providing payments to another
corporation that they owned without the minority), have been struck
down.3 8
The more recent of these was a common law decision in which a
court in Prince Edward Island held that the majority could not vote to
ratify a contract with another corporation in which they also owned the
majority interest, for they would, in effect, be benefiting themselves and
arguably paying money out of the corporation to the detriment of the
minority.39 In a similar case a corporation entered into an agreement
with a franchisor that was owned by the majority. As a result, the minority was excluded from the payments for the franchise, which went
exclusively to the majority. A British Columbia court held the action
oppressive under its statutory oppression remedy. 4 Thus, in effect, the
concept of a fiduciary obligation owed by the majority is being adopted
by the courts in the context of interested contracts, where a conflict of
interest exists because the majority is on both sides of the bargain.4 1
The recent Canadian legislation has also strengthened the standards
applicable to interested director's transactions and to majority ratification of those transactions.4 2 The traditional Canadian common law doctrine was that any interested director's transaction was voidable unless
ratified by the majority.4 3 Corporations tended, therefore, to adopt articles that gave broad powers to directors, and majority shareholders, to
enter into contracts with the corporation in which they had an interest.'
The Canadian statutes build on and extend traditional approaches. They
37 See supra, note 7 and accompanying text.
38 See Diligentiv. R WMD OperationsKelowna Ltd, supra, note 5. See also Wedge v. McNeill
(1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 596, 33 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 272 (P.E.I. S.C.) (majority cannot vote to ratify
unfair contract), rev'd (1982), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 133, 39 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 205 (P.E.I. C.A.) (insufficient factual basis for decision).
39 Wedge v. McNeill, ibid. The appellate court reversed the decision because the agreed statement of facts on which it was based was not adequate to support it, but the court left open the
question of ratification.
40 Diligenti v. R WMD OperationsKelowna Ltd., supra, note 5. The statutory provision is the
Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59, s. 224.
41 But not without hesitation; see, eg., Wotherspoon v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1982), 129
D.L.R. (3d) 1, 35 O.R. (2d) 449 (C.A.).
42 See, e.g., CBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 115; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 132. See also Dickerson et
al, supra, note 2 at vol. 2, s. 9.17 & vol. 1, paras. 227-33.
43 See, eg., Aberdeen RaiL Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854), 1 Macq. 461, 2 Eq. Rep. 1281, [18431860] All E.R. Rep. 249, 149 R.R. 32 (H.L.).
44 See Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 1, para. 226.
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not only require that directors declare their interest and refrain from voting on a contract in which they have an interest, but also impose an
objective standard that must be met with respect to the contract, namely
that the contract be fair and reasonable to the corporation at the time
that it is made, even if the majority ratifies it.4' While it might be argued
that these statutes merely adopted the standard already espoused in
Beatty,46 they seem to go much further. Section 132(9) of the OBCA, for

example, grants a direct remedy to shareholders to enforce the standard
without having to use the derivative action procedure. 7
The modem attitude to these problems is pervasive. The traditional
approach of Canadian courts, the acceptance of majority rule, was that
business decisions were matters for the directors and the majority shareholders; the courts would not interfere with them because they were internal management decisions.48 In Burland v. Earle, the Privy Council,
on an appeal from an Ontario court, held that the question of corporate
dividends was beyond the jurisdiction of that court to deal with, but was
for the directors, and thus the majority shareholders, to determine.'
That conclusion was questioned by Wegenast in his 1931 text and would
probably not be followed today. 0
The Dickerson Committee, when recommending the statutory oppression remedy, specifically referred to a "freeze-out" of minority shareholders in a closely held corporation by a refusal to declare dividends as
an example of oppressive conduct which would provide a basis for invoking the new provisions.51 Thus the committee clearly contemplated that
the courts would consider issues relating to internal management, where
the business of a corporation is conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to, or which unfairly disregards the interests
of, a minority, and a
52
few cases have tended to move in this direction.
A number of cases brought under the oppression provisions have
been based on notions of fairness which reflect the expectations of the
45 See, eg., OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 132(7)-(8); see also Dickerson et al., supra, note 2 at vol.
1, para. 228 (to prevent mutual "back-scratching").
46 See supra, note 21 and accompanying text.
47 See supra, note 35. See also CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 115(8). This conclusion seems clear
on the plain words of the statutes, but the provisions have not yet been the subject of judicial
consideration.
48 See cases cited supra, notes 7 & 9.
49 Burland v. Earle, supra, note 9 at 93.
50 See Wegenast, supra, note 13 at 618-19.
51 See Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 1, para. 484.
52 An action to require a declaration of dividends has been brought under the oppression section of the CBCA; see Bernstein, "Cautionary Tale Unfolds in Kruger Brothers' Bitter Court Case"
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 May 1986) BI 1; see also Bernstein, "Kruger Battle Will Leave Its
Mark on Accountants, Lawyers" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (16 June 1986) B8.
The appellant in Ferguson, supra, note 5 requested an order requiring the corporation to declare
a dividend, but the court did not address this issue; see ibid., Appellant's Statement, Action No.
1024/81, filed 31 January 1983, para. 58(c). The author was of counsel on the appellant's brief on
the appeal.
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parties in the context of closely held corporations.5 3 In short, the courts
have attempted to implement the actual expectations of the shareholders,
and where those expectations have been thwarted by the conduct of the
majority, have provided remedies. In Diligenti,there was a diversion of
assets through a special contract and a shareholder-director was removed
from his office in the corporation.5 4 Similarly, in Ferguson, where the
controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation attempted to
squeeze out his wife, after their marriage broke up, through an amendment to the corporate constitution, the court considered the expectations
of the parties when the corporation began and attempted to implement
them by striking down the amendment.5 5
This approach has also been adopted with respect to applications to
wind up a closely held corporation.5 6 The expectations of the parties are
implemented by allowing a winding-up on the basis of concepts generally
applicable to partnerships.5" Canadian courts are thus moving toward a
concept of fairness premised on the expectations of the parties, at least
for closely held corporations.5 8
Perhaps the most revealing area for majority-minority relations relates to amendment of the corporate constitution. An amendment can be
used for any number of purposes and can affect shareholders differentially. For example, the constitution could be amended to give the directors or the majority shareholders powers that would enable them to
squeeze out a minority.59 The traditional standard applicable to corporate amendments is that the majority shareholders have to act in good
faith for the .benefit of the corporation as a whole,' a high-sounding
phrase which can mean everything or nothing. In the early English cases
53 See, eg., Diligenti v. R WMD OperationsKelowna Ltd., supra, note 5; Ferguson,supra, note
5. See also, Re Bird PrecisionBellows Ltd. (1983), [1984] 3 All E.R. 444 (Ch.), aff'd (1985), [1985] 3
All E.R. 523 (C.A.).
54 See ibid. For a different court's perspective, compare Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc. (1976), 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657. But see Re Cucci's RestaurantLtd., supra, note 31.
55 See Ferguson, supra, note 5 at 727-28.
56 See, eg., Ebrahimi v. Westbourne GalleriesLtd. (1972), [1973] A.C. 360, [1972] 2 All E.R.
492 (H.L.); Re Rogers andAgincourt Holdings Ltd. (1976), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 152, 14 O.R. (2d) 489
(C.A.).
57 See cases cited supra, note 56; see also, eg., Re Dunham and Apollo Tours Ltd. (No. 2)
(1978), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 595, 20 O.R. (2d) 9 (Ont. H.C.). The partnership analogy applies when the
relationship between the shareholders is a personal one involving mutual trust and confidence and
participation in the corporate enterprise and where no market for their shares exists; a falling out
between them that precludes their continuing as shareholders therefore requires dissolution of the
corporation or a similar resolution of their differences.
58 Cf. Re R.J. Jowsey Mining Co. Ltd. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 97, [1969] 2 0.R. 549 (C.A.)
(winding up of public corporation). It is worth noting that there is substantial identity between the
statutory grounds for a judicial winding up and the oppression standards; compare, eg., OBCA,
supra, note 4 at s. 206(l)(a) with ibid. at s. 247(2).
59 See, e.g., Sidebottom v. Keershaw, Leese & Co. Ltd. (1919), [1920] 1 Ch. 154 (C.A.) (directors); Dafen Tinplate Co. Ltd. v. Llanelly Steel Co. (1907) Ltd. (1920), [1920] 2 Ch. 124 (majority
shareholders).
60 See, eg., Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd., supra, note 25 at 672 (per Lindley M.R.).
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it tended to mean little. 61 The standard requiring the majority to act in
the interests of the corporation was generalized and objective; if a proposed amendment to the corporate constitution theoretically affected all
shareholders in the same way, it was treated as being in the interests of
the corporation as a whole. 62 This was true even though it might have a
discriminatory impact on individual shareholders.6 3
An example will illustrate this point. The leading early case, Allen
v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd.,64 upheld an amendment to the corporate constitution which permitted the directors to impose a lien on fully
paid shares in the amount owed on unpaid shares on which calls had
been made. This amendment was upheld where the only shareholder
who held both types of shares had died and the majority wanted to obtain his shares as payment without allowing his estate to transfer them.
The court, even though it recognized that the transaction was intended
for this purpose, upheld it on the basis that theoretically the directors
could do the same with respect to any shareholder.
An amendment to the corporate constitution was also permitted
even though it was designed to enable the directors to remove a specific
shareholder. 6 The amendment was allowed because the shareholder in
question was viewed as a problem for the corporation; the court held that
a corporation should be able to remove at any time shareholders who, for
example, might compete with it.6 6 A few cases in the lower courts focused on the effect on the individual shareholder of a decision that would
be made pursuant to a proposed constitutional amendment which was
clearly intended to remove a minority shareholder rather than one who
represented a broader problem. 67 But those cases were disparaged in
later decisions of the Court of Appeal.6 8
The most recent case in England which typifies this approach was
the last of a series of decisions in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In
61 See, e.g., ibid.; see also Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., supra, note 25. The reasons of
Lord Evershed in the Greenhaigh case, a low point in English corporate jurisprudence, are more
fully reproduced in the latter, unofficial report.
62 See, eg., supra, notes 60-61; see also, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead)
Ltd. (1926), [1927] 2 K.B. 9 (C.A.).
63 See, e.g., Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., supra, note 25.
64 See supra, note 25.
65 See, eg., Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese & Co. Ltd., supra, note 59; cf. Shuttleworth v. Cox
Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead)Ltd., supra, note 62 (removal of director).
66 The court cited Phillipsv. Manufacturers Securities Ltd. (1917), 86 L.J.Ch. 305 (C.A.), in
which a similar power was included in the corporation's articles of association (that is, bylaws) at the
time of incorporation. Interestingly, the reasoning in these cases is similar to that in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCHi), para. 92,077 (Del. 1985)
(discriminatory issuer tender offer upheld).
67 See Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co. Ltd. (1919), [1919] 1 Ch. 290; Dafen Tinplate Co.
Ltd. v. Lianelly Steel Co. (1907) Ltd, supra, note 59.
68 See Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese & Co. Ltd, supra, note 59 (limiting Brown); Shuttleworth
v. Cox Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead)Ltd., supra, note 62 (disapproving of Dafen).
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Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas,6 9 the English Court of Appeal permitted an amendment to the corporation's articles of association designed to

enable the majority shareholder to sell his control block, without having
to give the only minority shareholder a first option to purchase those
shares, by deleting a provision that would have required him to do so.
The court, while reiterating the standard that the majority must act bona
fide for the benefit of the corporation as a whole and declaring that an
amendment could not be discriminatory, nevertheless permitted the
amendment which deprived the minority shareholder of his right of first
refusal.70
In the last twenty years that approach has been substantially altered.
A majority shareholder would now be quite unlikely to get by with such
transactions. The statutory oppression standard is much broader than
common law oppression, for it includes conduct that unfairly disregards

the interests of a minority shareholder. 71 Even without legislative redi-

rection, the courts have of their own initiative begun to redress the balance. The Clemens decision,7 z for example, disallowed amendments to a
corporation's articles of association which would have deprived a minority shareholder of her negative control and enabled the majority to pass a

special resolution alone. The court's analysis was not unlike that of the
California Supreme Court in Jones v. HF. Ahmanson & Co.; 73 it considered the alternative methods which the majority shareholders could have
used to implement their espoused goal, and, in concluding that their action was oppressive, took into account the fact that they went further
than necessary to achieve it. Alternatives to accomplish their stated purpose that would not have harmed the minority were not attempted. The
court viewed these facts as indicating an intent to oppress. 74
69 See supra, note 25. The events and cases leading up to this decision are outlined in Gower,
supra, note 3, at 624-26.
70 Ironically, the English courts applied a similar standard to votes by a class of shareholders in
a more protective manner, by requiring shareholders to vote for the benefit of the class as a whole
and precluding them from voting to further their non-class interests; see British American Nickel
Corp. Ltd. v. MJ. O'Brien Ltd. (1927), [1927] 1 D.L.R. 1121, [1927] A.C. 369 (P.C.); Re Holders
Investment Trust Ltd. (1970), [1971] 1 W.L.R. 583 (Ch.). A recent decision in Newfoundland applied the more protective class standard in the context of a squeeze-out arrangement proposed by a
majority shareholder, see Re Standard ManufacturingCo. andBaird (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 697, 45
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 159 (Nfid. S.C.) [hereinafter Standard cited to D.L.R.].
71 See supra, note 30 and accompanying text; see also CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 234.
72 Supra, note 28.
73 See supra, note 33.
74 See Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd, supra, note 28 at 279-82. Although it drew an inference
adverse to the majority from the fact that no evidence was presented to show a legitimate corporate
purpose for the amendments, the court stopped short of shifting the burden of proving such a purpose to the defendants. Canadian courts have generally refrained from imposing an onus on a fiduciary to demonstrate the fairness or propriety of his self-interested conduct; see, eg., Teck Corp. Ltd.
v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 at 330, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 at 430 (B.C.S.C.); see also, eg.,
Cheffv. Mathes (1964), 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548; Jones v. HF Ahmanson & Co., supra, note
33 at 476. But see Gray v. New AugaritaPorcupineMines Ltd. (1952), [1952] 3 D.L.R. 1 at 14 (P.C.)
(interested director's contract).
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The cases that most clearly reflect this altered approach in the context of amendment of the corporate constitution deal with corporate
squeeze-outs. A number of squeeze-outs, or "goings private," in Canada
and England in the last decade have provoked a much stronger inclination to protect minorities against a majority's ability to impose its will.
One of the most dramatic examples is the Re Hellenic & GeneralTrust7 5
case, in which a majority shareholder proposed an arrangement that
would have removed, or "cashed out," the minority shareholders. The
court concluded that the minority, because their economic interests were
different, constituted a separate class of shareholders and gave them a
separate vote which enabled them to veto the transaction.7 6
In a number of cases in Ontario, both under the statutory oppression remedy and the common law, courts have accepted similar arguments and have enjoined "going private" transactions that would have
forced the minority out of the corporation." In fact, the courts have
tended to restrict the availability of a second stage squeeze-out following
a tender offer on the basis of an express power of compulsory acquisition
granted under the statutes.7 8 Canadian corporations Acts generally permit an offeror who acquires 90% of the outstanding shares (or of a class
of shares) of a corporation through a takeover bid to expropriate the
remaining 10% minority. 79 The minority shareholders may utilize a judicial appraisal procedure to ensure that they obtain the fair value of
their shares,8" but if the takeover bid has been at arm's length the offer
75 (1975), [1976] 1 W.L.R. 123 (Ch.).
76 See ibid. at 125-27. See also Standard, supra, note 70 at 699-700.
77 See, eg., Carlton Realty Co. Ltd. v. Maple Leaf Mills Ltd. (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 106, 22
O.R. (2d) 198 (Ont. H.C.) (no express statutory authorization of squeeze-out; preliminary injunction
granted); Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco Ltd. (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 116, 22 O.R. (2d) 211 (Ont. H.C.)
(preliminary injunction against squeeze-out on basis of oppression remedy) [hereinafter Alexander
cited to D.L.R.]; Ruskin v. CanadaAll-News Radio Ltd. (1979), 7 B.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C.) (preliminary injunction); cf Standard,supra, note 70. Compare TriadOil Holdings Ltd. v. ProvincialSecretary for Manitoba (1967), 59 W.W.R. 1 (Man. C.A.) (approval of amalgamation, under statute
requiring court's approval, where legitimate business purpose demonstrated, transaction was fair to
all parties and majority of minority shareholders had voted in favour).
78 See, eg., Alexander, ibid. at 123-24; Burdon v. Zeller's Ltd. (1981), 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. S.C.).
Cf.Gower, supra, note 3 at 622-23.
79 See, e.g., CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 199; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 187. The provision
derives originally from the English Companies Act, 1929 (U.K.), c. 23, s. 155; see generally Gower,
supra, note 3 at 622. The history of the section in Canada is discussed in P. Anisman, Takeover Bid
Legislation in Canada: A Comparative Analysis (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 1974) at 77-78; D.J.
McNamara, "Note on Compulsory Acquisition of Shares" (1971) 10 West. Ont. L. Rev. 141; A.M.
Flisfeder, "Compulsory Acquisition of the Interest of a Dissenting Minority Shareholder" (1973) 11
Alta. L. Rev. 87; S.H. Halperin, "Statutory Elimination of Minority Shareholders in Canada" in L.
Sarna, ed., Corporate Structure Financeand Operations: Essays on the Law and Business Practice
(Toronto: Carswell, 1980) 1.
80 See, e.g., CBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 199; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 187. The Ontario Act also
permits a minority security holder to require a person who acquires over 90% of a class of securities,
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price will usually govern."1 At least one Canadian court has held that
the compulsory acquisition provision precludes a majority shareholder
from using an amalgamation to go private after a takeover bid in which it
acquired less than 90% of the offeree corporation's outstanding shares;
the court prohibited a cash out amalgamation by interpreting the statutory provision as the exclusive method of expropriating shareholders.8 2
The O.S.C. adopted the approach of Hellenic in its Cablecastingdecision where it accepted a commitment from the majority shareholders
not to proceed with a squeeze-out reorganization unless a majority of the
other than debt securities, to purchase the securities held by the former security holder and to invoke
the appraisal mechanism to obtain the fair value of his securities; see OBCA, ibid. at s. 188.
The appraisal procedure is based on the procedure available to shareholders who dissent from
structural alterations of the corporation and choose instead to receive the fair value of their shares;
see, ag., CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 184; OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 184. These provisions were
introduced in Canada by Dickerson et aL, supra, note 2 at vol. 2, s. 14.17, and were based on similar
legislation in New York: see ibid. at vol. 1, para. 373. Although the dissenting shareholder's appraisal remedy constitutes a significant element of the total scheme of majority-minority relations
under the recent Canadian corporations statutes, it is beyond the scope of this paper, as it was the
subject of another paper at the Comparative Corporation Law Conference in 1984; see Macintosh,
"The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical Reappraisal" (1988) 13 Can.-U.S. L.J.
299; see also, eg., Beck, supra, note 30 at 329-33.
81 See, eg., Re Hoare and Co. Ltd. (1933), [1933] All E.R. Rep. 105 (Ch.); Re Press Caps Ltd.
(1949), [1949] 1 All E.R. 1013 (C.A.); Re Grierson, Oldham &Adams, Ltd. (1966), [1967] 1 All E.R.
192 (Ch.); Re Shoppers City and M. Loeb, Ltd. (1968), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 35, [1969] 1 O.R. 449 (Ont.
H.C.). See also, eg., Halperin, supra, note 79 at 36-41. The same approach would not apply where
the compulsory acquisition provision is used in an attempt to squeeze out a minority shareholder of a
closely held corporation; see, eg., Re Bugle PressLtd. (1960), [1960] 3 All E.R. 791 (C.A.) (precluding use of provision for this purpose with respect to a single shareholder of a three shareholder
corporation). The reasoning of this decision was extended back to public corporations as well, with
the result that only the shares of minority shareholders, at least arm's length offerees, are counted in
the calculation of the 90% threshold; see, eg., Esso Standard (Intern-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enterprises Ina and Morrisroe (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 598, [1963] S.C.R. 144; and this method of determining the percentage has been incorporated in the statutes; see, eg., OBC4, supra, note 4 at s. 187.
The Ontario Act also limits these powers of compulsory acquisition to public corporations; see ibid.
at s. 187(1) and compare CBC4, supra, note 2 at s. 199(1) ("take-over bid").
See also Re the Acquisition by Quegroup Investments Ltd. of all the Common Sharesof Queenswear (Canada)Ltd. (1976), [1976] C.S. 1458 (Qu6. Sup. Ct), a summary of a decision in which the
Quebec Superior Court denied use of the compulsory acquisition provision to further an attempt to
"go private" by a corporation that had gone public only two and one-half years earlier; the transaction is described in P. Anisman, "Insider Trading under the Canada Business Corporations Act" in
Meredith MemorialLectures 1975: CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct (Toronto: DeBoo, 1975) 151
at 271 n.699.
82 See Burdon v. Zeller's Ltd, supra, note 78; see also Alexander, supra, note 77 at 123-24
(suggesting same result). It is not clear whether this conclusion is limited to squeeze-outs of minority shareholders following a take-over bid for all the outstanding shares of the offeree corporation in
which the offeror fails to reach the 90% threshold. In Ferguson,supra, note 5, the appellant argued
that the holding in Burdon applied as well in the context of a closely held corporation where no prior
take-over bid was made, but the court did not address this issue; see Appellant's Statement, supra,
note 52 at para. 56(a)-(c). Although the compulsory acquisition section of the Ontario Act applies
only to public corporations, a variation of this argument may be made with respect to Ontario
corporations.
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minority shareholders voted in favour of it.83 As a result of this proceeding the commission reconsidered its policy governing going private trans-

actions and added a majority-of-the-minority requirement to it 84 which it
too has applied where a single shareholder held a majority of the minority shares.85

The commission's approach has been adopted in the OBCA, which
has gone further in this regard than any other corporations Act in the
country.8 6 The OBCA contains a provision which requires that the minority shareholders of a public corporation, in any type of "going private
transaction,"8 7 be given a separate vote with respect to approval of that
transaction. 88 The approval required is a majority of the minority share83 See Re CablecastingLtd. (1978), [1978] O.S.C. Bull. 37.
84 See "Notice: 'Going Private' Transactions" (1978), [1978] O.S.C. Bull. 214. See now O.S.C.
Policy 9.1, supra, note 6. The policy requires a valuation as well as minority approval.
85 See Re M. Loeb Ltd. (1978), [1978] O.S.C. Bull. 333. The O.S.C. imposed its going private
requirements through adoption of a policy statement and enforced its policy by exercising or threatening to exercise its power to issue orders prohibiting trading in specific securities in Ontario; see
Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 27 at c. 466, s. 123. The O.S.C.'s view of the obligations of
majority shareholders was forcefully stated in its rejection of the corporation's argument that amalgamations should be regulated exclusively under the corporation's legislation:
When the company that now wishes to go private sold its securities to the public, it
accepted certain obligations of so doing; one of those obligations is to deal fairly with those
members of the public who have invested in the corporation. It is fairness that Policy 3-37
is directed to, and it is not for the majority to tell the minority what is fair or what is in its
best interest. It is for the minority to make that decision by a majority vote. That is what
Policy 3-37 requires and it is that Policy that we insist on being adhered to in this transaction and in issuing a cease trading order to prevent the amalgamation squeeze-out
proposed.
[1978] O.S.C. Bull. at 348.
86 See OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 189.
87 A "going private transaction" is defined as any type of transaction which would result in the
termination of the interest of a security holder of the corporation without his consent other than a
redemption pursuant to the terms of the security, compulsory acquisition under section 187 of the
Act or dissolution of the corporation under the Act. The definition also excludes a transaction in
which a security holder will receive an equivalent security with respect to participation in earnings in
the corporation or an affiliate or successor of the corporation. The provision's protection is not
granted to holders of non-participating securities, that is, holders of securities that are limited in the
extent of their participation in earnings "in all circumstances." A security convertible into a participating security and a warrant carrying a right to acquire a participating security or a security convertible into one are treated as participating securities. See ibid at s. 189(1).
88 See ibid. at s. 189(4). The statute also requires that a valuation be prepared as of a date not
more than 120 days before the announcement of a going private transaction indicating a per security
value or range of values for each class of securities affected. The value may not reflect a minority
discount, and if any part of the consideration to be received by the departing shareholders is other
than cash, the valuation must include the valuer's opinion that it is equal to or greater than the
securities to be received for it: ibid. at s. 189(2). The valuation must be made available to security
holders upon request and a summary of it must be included in the management proxy circular sent
to security holders in connection with the meeting called to approve the transaction: ibid. at s.
189(3)(a). At least 40 clear days' notice must be given for any such meeting: ibid. See also ibid. at s.
1(1)13 ("day").
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89
holders voting, unless they are to receive consideration other than cash
or cash in an amount less than the value of the securities as determined in
a mandatory valuation, in which cases approval by at least two-thirds of
the minority is necessary.9" Shares held by affiliates of the corporation,
by persons who will receive in the transaction "a per security consideration greater than that available to other holders of affected securities of
the same class," by persons who effectively control the corporation,
either alone or as a group, and by persons who before the proxy circular
is sent "entered into an understanding that they would support the going
private transaction" may not be counted when determining whether the
requisite approval has been obtained. 9 1 Again, this gives the minority
shareholders a veto power based on notions of fairness92 and on the view
that minority shareholders, who are necessary to the market, will only go
into a marketplace which has integrity. 93
The protection of minority shareholders has been extended by the
O.S.C. to a number of other types of transaction in which the majority
may benefit. 94 The commission requires a public corporation that intends to create non-voting or "restricted voting" shares to obtain the ap95
proval of a majority of the minority shareholders of the corporation.
The same requirements apply to amalgamations and other forms of corporate reorganization which result in any outstanding securities becoming "restricted shares" and to any distribution of securities "by way of
89 For the purposes of the going private provision a right to receive cash within 90 days after a
transaction is approved is treated as cash; see ibid. at ss. 189(2)(a) & 189(4)1.i.
90 See ibid. at s. 189(4)1-2; see also supra, note 88.
91 Ibid. at s. 189(4)3.
92 See supra, note 85. The provision may, however, weaken the argument concerning the exclusivity of the compulsory acquisition provision with respect to public corporations, at least where
the going private transaction does not follow a takeover bid for all the outstanding shares; see supra,
note 82.
93 The O.S.C. has frequently based its policy decisions on a declaration that the integrity of the
market is necessary to ensure investor confidence; see, e.g., O.S.C. Policy 9.3, 3 Can. See. L. Rep.
(CCH), para. 471-903 (1983) (prebid private purchases integrated with subsequent takeover bid).
See also, e.g., Re McLaughlin and S.B. McLaughlin Associates Ltd., supra, note 27 at 59. Cf P.
Anisman et al., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1979) at s. 102(g) (Draft Act) & ibid. at vol. 2, 1-2 (Commentary).
94 But not all such transactions, even where a breach of fiduciary obligation may be involved:
see, e.g., Re Irving S. Lindzon and 370815 Ontario Ltd. (1982), 4 O.S.C. Bull. 43C at 59C-60C
(interested director's transaction which "could be regarded as oppressive and improvident by the
shareholders of" the corporation not restrained as matter better left to courts).
95 See O.S.C. Policy 1.3, s. VI, 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 471-103 (1984). "Restricted
voting shares" are defined as shares other than common shares which are entitled to vote subject to a
limit or restriction on the percentage of shares that may be voted by a person or group of persons.
The O.S.C. interprets the definition to include a class of shares which has lesser voting rights than
another class, even though it does not in terms do so; see, e.g., the definition of "subordinate shares"
in the Policy.
For purposes of this Policy securities held by an affiliate of the corporation or by persons who
effectively control the corporation may not be counted when determining whether minority approval
has been obtained; compare OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 189(4)3, and see supra, notes 87-93 and
accompanying text.
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96
stock dividend" or otherwise which has the same effect.
The O.S.C. also imposes a double pre-emptive right, like that included in some U.S. state legislation with respect to closely held corpora98
tions,97 on certain distributions of securities by public corporations.
The O.S.C. will not allow a rights offering to be made where a principal
security holder of the corporation has agreed to provide a standby commitment to purchase rights not acquired by other shareholders in the
rights offering "unless a second stage right to take up any such unsubscribed securities is offered on an acceptable pro rata basis to all security
99
The
holders of the class who exercised their initial rights in full."
not
shareholder
stated purpose of the policy is to ensure that a majority
units
in
obtain an advantage unavailable to the minority which results
° Rights
fairly increasing its proportionate interest in the corporation."
offerings that are priced at or above the market price of the shares or that
involve an option on additional securities as "ostensible consideration"
for a standby commitment by a controlling shareholder are therefore also
as a "refinement of a majorprecluded.10 1 The policy has been described
' 10 2
obligation."
fiduciary
ity shareholder's
Finally, a subject which has had some attention in the United States,
much in Canada, is the treatment of transactions between parent
not
but
and subsidiary corporations where the subsidiary is not wholly owned, in

96 The O.S.C.'s Policy 1.3 may, therefore, preclude certain types of "poison pill," for example,
those utilizing a blank stock discretion to create and issue preferred shares with multiple votes,
whether or not by means of a stock dividend. Cf., e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 92,857 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also
O.S.C. Policy No. 38, 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 470-038 (1986) ("Take-over Bids: Defensive
Tactics").
97 See, e.g., Maine Business CorporationAct, reprintedin A. Frey et al, Cases and Materialson
Corporations,2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) at 841-42.
98 See O.S.C. Policy 6.2, ss. VI.3-4, 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 471-602 (1983). Similar
requirements have been imposed in British Columbia and possibly Quebec; see Anisman, supra, note
6 at 101 & 148 nn.260-62.
99 O.S.C. Policy 6.2, supra, note 98 at s. VI.3(b). The restriction applies to a similar commitment by an associate or affiliate of a principal security holder. The policy presents an acceptable
method of second stage offer, namely, allowing shareholders who exercise their initial rights to
purchase at the same price the same percentage of the remaining securities as they obtained of the
initially offered securities, but states that other methods may also be acceptable.
100 Ibid. at ss. VIE.1-2.
101 Ibid. at ss. VIE. 1 & 3. The pricing criterion was adopted because shareholders are unlikely
to purchase rights offered at or above the market.
The O.S.C. derives its power to enforce the policy from the statutory notification procedure for
such offerings. A rights offering may be made without filing a prospectus under the Securities Act
only where notice of the offering, including its date, amount, nature and conditions and the net
proceeds to be obtained by the corporation if it is fully subscribed, is given to the commission and the
commission does not object to the offering within ten days; see OntarioSecurities Act, supra, note 27
at s. 71(1)(h).
102 Anisman, supra, note 6 at 101. It is worth noting that one Canadian court has required a
pre-emptive right in an action under the oppression section of the CBCA; see Re Sabex Internationale Ltde (1979), 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. Sup. Ct).
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other words, where there is a minority in the subsidiary. There are few
Canadian cases dealing with the difficult issues raised by the need to balance the interests of a parent corporation against those of the minority
shareholders in the subsidiary. 10 3 This issue is raised directly in cases
like Case v. New York CentralRailroadin which a majority of a subsidiary's tax savings was taken by the parent corporation and was not shared
equally with the subsidiary."°4
1 5
Although this issue has not yet been addressed in Canada, " there
are statements in one oppression case which suggest that English courts
would require a parent corporation to act with scrupulous fairness when
dealing with a subsidiary. 106 But that case involved a closely held corporation where the majority was squeezing out a minority shareholder. In
Canada these issues will be dealt with through the oppression remedy
and through the interested director's provision. 107 How these cases will
be decided cannot be predicted with any assurance. But the standard in
the oppression remedy that precludes a majority from unfairly disregarding the interests of the minority may suggest an answer.
In the last two decades, Canada has increased the protection available to minority shareholders when a majority engages in an interested
Most of the cases in which the issue might have arisen have not addressed it; see, e.g., Gray,
supra, note 21 (sale of property by a subsidiary to its parent at a price substantially below its true
value declared void); see also Wotherspoon v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1979), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at
697-711, 22 O.R. (2d) 385 at 537-51 (Ont. H.C.), affd (1982), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 40-46, 35 O.R.
(2d) 449 at 485-90 (C.A.) [hereinafter cited to D.L.R.], leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (1982), 37
O.R. (2d) 73, 44 N.R. 83. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text. The analysis in the latter case
follows traditional lines, discussing many of the cases cited supra, notes 7-14, 25-26 & 59-62, without
addressing directly the fact that the parent corporation obtained the exclusive opportunity to benefit
from the exploitation of the property transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary. In short, the lower
court's reasons followed the approach in the early English cases and focused on "the benefit of the
corporation as a whole" rather than the economic realities of the transactions. The Court of Appeal
affirmed with only a cursory discussion of this issue; see 129 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 40 & 44. The Supreme
Court of Canada has heard arguments but has not yet decided the appeal.
104 Case v. New York CentralRailroad (1965), 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d
607. The parent corporation took substantially all of the tax savings of the subsidiary. The case
presents a dramatic test of the essential meaning of fiduciary principles, for the subsidiary would not
have been able to obtain the tax savings without the parent and thus suffered no harm, while the
parent took virtually the whole of the benefit to itself.
105 But see Gray, supra, note 21 at 479-82 (per Robertson C.J.). Recognition of the issue is also
reflected in the CBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 42 and the OBCA, supra, note 4 at s. 20, both of which
except intercorporate guarantees and other financial assistance from their strictures where they are
given to a parent corporation by its wholly owned subsidiary; see CBCA, ibid. at s. 42(2)(c); OBCA,
ibid. at s. 20(2)(c).
106 See, e.g., Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer (1958), [1959] A.C. 324 at
343 (H.L.), Viscount Simonds.
107 The cases cited supra, note 103, involved interested director's transactions because of interlocking directors of the parent and subsidiary corporations. In fact, the majority in Gray based their
decision on the failure of the interested directors to refrain from voting. The earlier statutory provisions governing such contracts, however, did not impose a fairness or reasonableness standard; see
supra, note 42 and accompanying text. This new standard in the current corporations Acts provides
a basis for addressing the fiduciary obligation of a parent corporation to its subsidiary.
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transaction with its corporation. It is fair to say that Canadian legislative, judicial, and administrative decisions have reduced the ability of
majority shareholders to pursue their own goals without regard for the
interests of minority shareholders and, indeed, have made fiduciary standards applicable to their conduct. Although it is not clear yet where
these initial steps will lead, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future
the balance will continue to shift in favour of minority shareholders." 8

108 After this article went to press the Ontario and Quebec Securities Commissions issued orders preventing a takeover bid from proceeding for the common shares of Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd.:
see 10 O.S.C. Bull. 509 & 517 (decision and order, respectively); (1987), 18 C.V.M.Q. Bull. Al (16
January 1987, No. 3). The bid had been made for 49% of the outstanding common shares after the
offeror had obtained commitments from three members of the Billes family, the controlling shareholders, to deposit their shares at a price which the commission found was designed to provide the
Billeses a substantial premium over the market price of the shares based on a sale of all of their
shares without triggering a "coattail" provision attached to a class of non-voting common shares
held by public investors for which a bid was not made. The common shares represented 8% of the
corporation's equity, the remaining 92% being the non-voting shares. The O.S.C., in determining
the "public interest" pursuant to the Ontario Securities Act, see supra, note 27 at s. 123, adopted a
test requiring that a transaction "must clearly be demonstrated to be abusive of shareholders in
particular and of capital markets in general" for it to exercise its prohibitive powers, and declared
the standard to be different from and one that goes beyond "a complaint of unfairness." The O.S.C.
took support for its decision from its finding that the Billeses in seeking and agreeing to the bid
breached a fiduciary obligation owed by them as directors and controlling shareholders to the minority shareholders; Re Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. (1987), 10 O.S.C. Bull. 858 at 947-48 & 954-55, aff'd
(1987), 10 O.S.C. Bull. 1772. Although the commission emphasized the public aspects of the abuse
found by it, its concern was premised to a significant extent on fiduciary premises and its decision is a
further step in the direction suggested in the text; compare, e.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co.
(1961), 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn.), afld (1962), 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.), cert. denied (1963), 372
U.S. 941.

Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders'
Fiduciary Responsibilities*
John A. C. Hetherington**
Conflicts between the interests of the controlling and minority shareholders in stock corporations have been and continue to be a major perhaps the single most important - problem in corporation law. Such
conflicts undoubtedly account for almost all litigation among shareholders in closely held firms. In publicly held companies, litigation often results from the alleged violation of shareholders' rights by managers, if
there is no controlling shareholder or group of shareholders, or by managers and the controlling shareholder or coalition of shareholders, if
there is one. There can be little doubt that problems of this sort are the
most pervasive source of litigation in corporation law. The rubric under
which such disputes are resolved is fiduciary duty: to what extent does
the law require that in the transaction involved those in control take account of the interests of the shareholders who are not in control and
share with them the benefits generated by the transaction?
This article will present an analysis and critique of the treatment of
these problems under conventional corporate doctrine, from which it will
conclude that the rhetoric of the law in this area consists largely of
nonanalytical generalizations of "principles" which are unhelpful in predicting specific case results. The article will then offer an alternative
mode of analysis and attempt to show that this alternative approach is
more successful in accounting for and, hopefully, anticipating results in
situations that frequently produce litigation.

I.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Lawyers are accustomed to thinking of corporations as legal constructs whose essential features, including the rights of persons with different relationships to the corporation-shareholders, managers,
directors, and creditors-are spelled out with varying degrees of completeness in the statutes and elaborated upon and supplemented by the
case law. Once a business firm has been organized as a stock corporation, and the organizers have selected the specific structure from the various options available under the statute, the rights and obligations of
those who subsequently buy stock are fixed, subject to the possibility of
* Previously published 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9 (1987) and reprinted here with permission
and minor emendations.
** David A. Harrison Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
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future amendment under the procedure prescribed in the statute. Traditionally, the role of managers, whose obligations are to be loyal and diligent in serving the interests of the shareholders, and the responsibilities
of the controlling shareholders to other shareholders have gone unmentioned in the statutes, being left to the law of agency as developed by the
courts. In many respects organizing a stock corporation under a modem
statute is like buying a ready-made suit: some features are variable and
may be selected by the purchaser, but many essential characteristics are
automatically included in all models. It does not follow, of course, that
purchasers do not desire these unmentioned standard features; on the
contrary, they are often what the purchasers intend to buy. The point is
that these features are not the subject of negotiation; they are standard
forms. To the extent that standard forms reflect the desires of the parties, they reduce the costs of transacting. Difficulties arise, however,
where the meaning of the standard forms is not clearly spelled out and,
therefore, cannot be anticipated by the parties and would not have been
agreed to by them in advance.
Fiduciary duties of managers and controlling shareholders are, as
the frequency of litigation shows, an extremely important part of the corporate package. They are a fixed feature of the legal model; rarely does
bargaining occur with respect to them. Lawyers and judges interpreting
the law as it applies to a particular transaction will advise the parties
what their rights and obligations are or were in a particular situation
based on their analysis of the legal model. Little or no reference will be
made in the process to the ex ante expectations of the parties. The law is
said to determine the existence and the extent of fiduciary obligations. In
the words of an English judge in a 1887 leading case dealing with a contract of purchase between a company and its principal shareholder, "[I]t
would be very undesirable even to appear to relax the rules relating to
dealings between trustees and their beneficiaries." 1 It was apparent then,
as it is today, that fiduciary standards were set by the courts, not by the
parties, and it was true then, as now, that the limits of those obligations
were ill-defined.
At the same time, the vigor of judicial rhetoric describing fiduciary
obligations in cases in which such obligations are found and enforced is
extreme. The standards have been said by Judge Cardozo, whose opinions on this subject
are among his most famous, to be "inveterate" and
"unbending." 2 Parties found to have violated these obligations are conI North-West Trans. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589, 600 (P.C. 1887).
2 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).

This was a joint venture
case in which the court of appeals, by a 4-3 vote, held that one participant had breached his duty of
loyalty to the other. Id. at 480, 164 N.E. at 553. Judge Cardozo's opinion characterized the standards of fiduciary duty as requiring "not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive," id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546, which is undoubtedly the most widely cited pronouncement
on the subject in both partnership and corporation law as applied to directors and officers. Cardozo's most famous case dealing with a corporate director is Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec.
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demned as morally delinquent. There is no talk here of party autonomy,
or of such pale and tentative concepts as interest balancing or reasonable
expectations.
The tone of the opinions in this area is, of course, deliberate. By
obscuring the limits of fiduciary obligations under moralistic rhetoric and
by verbally chastising those who are found to have violated the standard,
or come close to doing so, the courts seek to maintain the standard by
discouraging marginal behavior which might or might not violate it.' It
is the imprecision of the standard and the fact that there are limitations
on its scope which cannot be acknowledged in the judicial formulations
that lead the courts to employ excessive rhetorical force in promulgating
fiduciary doctrine. Where content and limits of rules are clear, one need
only state the rule. Ambiguity breeds vehemence. Further, the knowledge that fiduciary principles cannot be precisely and minutely enforced
leads to the use of strong language as a control mechanism. This type of
judicial rule-making has the effect of discouraging bargaining among parties. Bargaining is facilitated by precise ex ante allocations of rights:
lacking such an allocation, parties do not know what they are giving up
or receiving, and the likelihood of negotiation is reduced as its difficulty
is increased. The relationship between managers and shareholders, and
among shareholders involving fiduciary obligations, are the only voluntary relationships in commercial law in which the applicable legal
"rules" inhibit party negotiation. It is also true that fiduciary rules are a
response to the difficulty of formulating the precise content of the obligations assumed by managers and controlling shareholders. It is ironic that
judicially formulated and imposed obligations, which are useful because
of the difficulty parties have in anticipating events and bargaining out the
details of on going relationships and the extent of sharing obligations
themselves, become an obstacle to party-negotiated solutions. Even the
suggestion that the scope of fiduciary obligations is or should be negotiable is suspect. Many lawyers would consider an attempt to modify fiduciary obligations by agreement to be invalid on policy grounds,4 like an
Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918), in which he asserted that the standard to be applied to
directors was one of "constant and unqualified fidelity." Id. at 489, 121 N.E. at 379. The leading
Delaware case is Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
3 See Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975). Professor Scott
argues that civil litigation performs two functions: first, settlement of the dispute before the court,
and second, modification of future behavior of nonparties. Appellate opinions are largely concerned
primarily with the latter cautionary or behavior modification function.
4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984) provides that a transaction in which a director
has a substantial adverse interest to the corporation is valid and not voidable by the corporation if,
after full disclosure, the transaction is approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, or by the
shareholders (excluding shares owned by the interested directors), or is "fair" to the corporation. It
is quite unlikely that a charter provision or bylaw which is more favorable to interested director
transactions than this provision would be sustained. See, e.g., Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224
Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978) (character providing that all corporate officers are permitted to do
business with the corporation does not negate need for officers' full disclosure of material facts of
transactions between themselves and corporation); Abeles v. Adams Eng'g Co., 35 N.J. 411, 173
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effort to contract out of the duty to exercise due care in the law of torts.
In this respect, the law dealing with fiduciary obligations contrasts
sharply with other areas of commercial law in which party autonomy is
the dominant principle and general law-supplied rules are designed to fill
in gaps in party-negotiated transactions which are based on the presumed
intent of the parties. 5
Finally, initial burden of fiduciary obligations rests on corporate officials. This burden is derived from the familiar principles of agency law
which require that agents be diligent and loyal in the service of the interests of their principals. Shareholders, on the other hand, have traditionally been said to owe no fiduciary obligations to each other.6 Each
shareholder, in exercising his voting rights, was said to be free to consult
only his own interest and preferences without regard to those of other
shareholders. The obligation now said to be imposed on majority shareholders is based on their ability to control the outcome of a shareholder
vote and to select and remove directors and other corporate officials.
The obligation is based in part on the cynical but realistic assumption
that elected officers, in exercising their discretionary authority, will favor
the interests of those whose votes elected them.7 In the case of public
officials, this tendency to prefer the interests of those who elected them is
tolerated so long as it falls short of outright bribery and corruption. To
guard against excessive favoritism, laws against bribery and laws requiring sealed bidding on public contracts were adopted. In private corporations, the courts have devised a simpler and more direct solution. It
makes no sense to hold majority shareholders responsible to the minority
for managerial decisions which adversely affect the minority and benefit
the majority, while permitting the majority to exercise its voting rights to
benefit itself and injure the minority. Therefore, the law has taken the
additional step of imposing fiduciary obligations on controlling
shareholders.8
Despite the all-embracing tone of judicial rhetoric in fiduciary duty
cases, the results make it clear that these pronouncements, like the first
amendment, are not to be taken literally. There are limits. Directors and
officers are not expected to toil ceaselessly for the welfare of the company
A.2d 246 (1961) (agreement between corporation and director, made without consent of stockholders, not enforceable unless "honest, fair and reasonable").
5 For a comparison of fiduciary principles applied to close corporations and relations between
ordinary contracting parties, such as business organization-customer and debtor-creditor, see infra
notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
6 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 240, at 653 (3d ed. 1983).
7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that the fiduciary duty
of a director "includes the dedication of his uncorrupted business judgment for the sole benefit of the
corporation in any dealings which may adversely affect it ....
[T]he same rule should apply to his
fiduciary duties as majority stockholder, for in that capacity he chooses and controls the directors,
and thus is held to have assumed their liability." Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) (citations omitted).
8 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 240, at 651.
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and its shareholders. They need not lend money to the company. 9 They
can sell property to the corporation at a substantial profit,1" and it has
been held that when an advantageous sale of corporate property can be
consummated only if a director agrees to sell his personally owned adjacent property, he may refuse to sell or demand a disproportionate share
of the total proceeds.I' Majority shareholders can sell property to the
company at a profit and demand a "fair" price. 2 Except in special cir-

cumstances, majority shareholders can generally sell their shares at a

premium not available to minority shareholders. 3 Executives and directors can take knowledge acquired in the business with them when they
leave and start competing firms as long as they do not steal trade secrets
or customer lists or breach a specific non-competition agreement.1 4 It
now appears, after some initial confusion, that majority shareholders
may compel the minority to sell its shares either to an outsider or to the
majority itself for any reason at any time as long as there is full disclosure
of the relevant facts respecting value and the price is "fair."' 5
The fiduciary doctrines enunciated by the courts provide little or no
basis to account for these limitations on the scope of managerial and
majority shareholder fiduciary responsibility. These results have been
considered by commentators as unprincipled and unjustifiable limitations
on the broad sweep of conventional fiduciary doctrine. 6 The analysis
presented in the following section suggests that this not the case. On the
contrary, it is argued that these limitations on the operation of fiduciary
doctrine are the working out of a balancing of interests among the par9 Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 81, 23 N.W.2d 375, 382 (1946).
10 The leading case is New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E.
102 (1926) (careful and balanced analysis by Justice Lehman).
"1 Dravosburg Land Co. v. Scott, 340 Pa. 280, 16 A.2d 415 (1940).
12 North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887).
13 There is an extensive literature on this subject. For references to the rule stated in the text,
see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 707-10 (5th ed. 1980)
and sources cited therein.
14 The leading case on executives and directors utilizing knowledge acquired through their
positions is Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). The court observed that
the defendant directors and officers who purchased a store which they caused to compete with the
plaintiff "intended to utilize the knowledge and experience that they had acquired in the [plaintiff]
company's employ" in competing with the plaintiff. Id. at 419, 34 N.E.2d at 706. The court further
stated that "[d]irectors and officers of a corporation are not, by reason of the fiduciary relationship
they bear toward the corporation, necessarily precluded from entering into an independent business
in competition with it, but, in doing so, they must act in good faith." Id. at 423, 34 N.E.2d at 707.
See also Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960) (use by defendant, chief chemist, of
secret formula he developed while employed by plaintiff does not, in absence of express contractual
prohibition against same, constitute breach of confidential relationship).
15 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (rejecting the business purpose test for
validating a minority freeze-out by majority shareholders).
16 The most widely cited critique of conflict of interest standards in corporate law is Marsh,
Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966). Extensive recent literature is cited in H.
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 641 n.10.
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ticipants in corporate enterprises and that they are consistent with the
interests and ex ante expectations of investors.
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The basic process by which goods and services are produced and
distributed in our society is the voluntary exchange transaction. The
economy is a network of such transactions between individuals and organizations. The voluntary exchange transaction is the fundamental unit of
economic intercourse: customers buy goods and services for cash or on
credit; lenders supply capital; employees and independent contractors
sell services; and suppliers sell goods to firms in such transactions. Individuals become members of organizations and acquire equity investments
similarly through voluntary exchanges. Such transactions are not the
only means through which organizations deal with outsiders; they are the
means by which the organization itself is built. The only difference in a
transaction between an organization and an outsider, such as a customer
or creditor, and an insider, such as a member or a shareholder, is in the
nature of the consideration which the organization gives to the person on
the other side of the transaction. An equity investor buys a different
commodity than a creditor. While the creditor usually receives an obligation for a fixed or determinable payment, the equity investor buys a
contractual right to a share of the future residual income generated by
the enterprise.17 Modem organizational theorists have come to regard
business organizations as complex structures composed of large numbers
of different and overlapping contracts under which all who deal with the
"organization" seek to promote their own welfare through exchange
transactions."1
The relations between a business organization and its customers,
creditors, employees, and suppliers are governed by various specialized
branches of contract law. These transactions are generally characterized
by the enterprise's clearly, specified advance promise of performance.
The business organization promises to deliver the goods or services called
for by its contracts with its customers and pay the specific amounts owed
to its employees, suppliers, and other creditors. If either party fails to
fulfill the contractual obligation it has incurred, the law may be invoked
to compel payment of whatever damages the injured party can prove it
suffered as a consequence of the breach. Such transactions are characterized in legal parlance as "arm's length," which means that no fiduciary
obligation is involved.9 Debtors, whether natural or corporate, are not
II.

CONTRACT:

The contractual nature of shareholder rights is explicit in Delaware. See E. FOLK, THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 109 (1972).
18 For a lucid exposition of this approach to business organization law, see Klein, The Modern
Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints,91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982).
19 An "arm's length transaction" is a transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting
in his or her own self-interest, and is the basis for a fair market value determination. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 100 (5th ed. 1979).
17
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said to owe fiduciary obligations to their creditors. The management of a
corporation, therefore, is not considered to owe a fiduciary obligation to
its creditors to manage the corporation competently so that it will be able
to pay its debts.2" If those who extend credit to incorporated firms consider it worth the trouble to bargain for protection to reduce the risk of
nonpayment, they may, and often do, demand security or covenants to
prevent the management or the shareholders from increasing the risk of
nonpayment by adopting more risky business activities. In any event, it
is clear that debtors, including corporations, are not the fiduciaries of
their creditors, since creditors are entitled only to the protection they
bargain for2 1 plus that provided by the law against dispositions of the
debtor's property which are fraudulent in fact or in law.
Where the investor buys an equity interest in the corporation, however, the law imposes a fiduciary obligation on management to manage
the enterprise so as to enhance the wealth of the investor. The explanation for the difference in the treatment of this type of obligation from all
others lies in the performance which the purchaser is buying. In sales of
goods and services in the market and in money loans, the expected performance by the parties can be specified in advance. The buyer or creditor can readily determine whether the seller or debtor is delivering the
contemplated performance. But the equity investor is buying a residual
claim, the value of which depends on the discretionary performance of
management. The details of this performance cannot be specified in advance, and the results are inescapably uncertain. Thus, it is not practicaThe point is so obvious that cases in which it is discussed are rare. See Byrns v. United
Telpherage Co., 105 A.D. 69, 70, 93 N.Y.S. 906, 907 (1905). The settled law on this point, however,
has recently been criticized. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW
413 (1986). McDaniel argues that corporate managers should owe fiduciary obligations to bondholders (but not, presumably, other creditors). Id. at 456. The author also argues that the extensive
use of debt securities in takeovers has demonstrated the inadequacy of contractual protections of
holders of debt securities. Id. at 413-14. The fact that contractual provisions developed in the past
have proved insufficient because of then unforeseen developments does not, however, establish a need
for changes in the legal rules governing financial contracting. Nor is there reason to think that the
buyers of debt securities cannot and will not demand changes in contractual protection or rates of
return in future debt securities based on recent experience. It is important to remember that some
courts regard conflicting interests between different classes of equity securities as matters of contract,
and that holders of one class owe no fiduciary obligation to another. The classic case is Goldman v.
Postal Telegraph, Inc. 52 F. Supp. 763 (1943). For a more recent case in this area see Baron v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch.), appealdismissed, 365 A.2d 136 (Del. 1975).
Uncertainty and ambiguity concerning financial rights would arise if managers were subjected
to fiduciary obligations to classes whose interests were in conflict, thereby introducing substantial
and very costly uncertainty into financial contracting. The exclusive claim of holders of junior equity issues on the best efforts obligations of managers to enhance their wealth is the essential contractual obligation which equity investors buy.
21 For a discussion of the law regarding the contractual protection afforded creditors, see Justice Adams' dissenting opinion in Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d
933, 946-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). The majority imposed liability in favor of
the holders of convertible debentures, not on fiduciary duty grounds, but principally on the ground
that the debenture holders' rights under the federal securities laws had been violated. See id. at 943.
20
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ble for the equity investor to demand, or management to promise,
specific results. Management may be both skillful and diligent, and the
venture may nevertheless fail. It is impracticable because it is too costly
for investors to subject the efforts of the managers to continuing personal
oversight and scrutiny. Other means must be found to give some assurance of management's continuing efforts to enhance shareholder wealth.
Easily the most important spur to management's efforts is self-interest.
Successful results increase managers' personal wealth through direct
compensation and through the resulting increase in the value of any investment they have in the firm. Success also enhances managers' prestige
and value in the hiring market and reduces the possibility of dismissal by
the present owners or through a take-over by outsiders. The incentives
provided by these considerations are supplemented by the legal sanctions
for breach of the duties of loyalty and competence. That managers are
bound to exercise due diligence in pursuit of this goal has not been seriously challenged in American law since Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.2 2 was
decided in 1919. In comparison with the inducements or self-interest
and the risk of removal, the risk of legal liability for breach of fiduciary
obligations is undoubtedly of secondary and perhaps of minimal importance in inducing managers to seek to promote the economic interest of
shareholders.23
There can be no question that the purpose of legally imposed fiduciary obligations is to induce managers to act in conformity with the expectations and interests of the shareholders. It would seem to follow that
the boundaries or limits of managers' obligations should be sought in the
express and implied contemplations of the parties, rather than in the immutable dogmas of judicial rhetoric invoking "inveterate" principles.
If one looks at fiduciary obligations as being derived from the intentions of the parties, the first question that arises is how much of a manager's fiduciary obligation would a rational shareholder seek to buy, and
how much would rational managers seek to sell. The same question
arises in connection with the obligations which have been imposed on the
majority shareholders toward the minority. In principle, the answer to
these questions is clear: shareholders in general would want to purchase
such obligations from managers up to the point at which the cost of any
further obligation would exceed the anticipated benefit the shareholders
22 204 Mich. 459, 170 NW. 668 (1919). The case is also reported at 3 A.L.R. 413 (1919) and
discussed in the subsequent annotation entitled "Right of business corporation to use its funds or
property for humanitarian purposes."
23 In an economy in which services and goods are bought and sold in voluntary exchange
transactions in markets, the function of the law is primarily to support market forces by enforcing
bargains and only infrequently by dictating their terms. Speaking of the role of the law in U.S.
economic history, Professor Hurst recently observed that "[r]elative to the whole play of factors that
produced the market, the law was marginal. This is not to say that the law was unimportant." J.
HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 9 (1982). He concluded that the "challenge to legal processes ... [at present] is to reach adjustments which will usefully supplement the
market without wastefully displacing it .... " Id. at 90.
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expect to receive. Managers presumably will demand more compensation in various forms as they agree to additional duties. Similarly, as the
equal sharing obligation on the controlling shareholders is broadened,
the less valuable a controlling position becomes. For their part, rational
minority shareholders would not seek sharing rights with the majority
beyond the point at which such rights cease to enhance the value of their
investment.
In practice, of course, it is uncertain where these limiting points are,
and the parties to such hypothetical negotiations might find that the cost
of identifying them in advance exceeded any projected benefit. But it is
absolutely clear, nevertheless, that there are such limitations. Shareholders could insist on such onerous burdens of loyalty on the part of managers that the price charged for such services would exceed the benefit.
Similarly, if it were practicable to insist that all the benefits of control
were equally shared among the shareholders, the value of control would
in theory be zero. As a result, it would not be worthwhile to any shareholder to try to assemble a controlling position. Under such a rule there
would be very little incentive for outsiders to buy in to displace management, and the effectiveness of the principal managerial control mechanism would be greatly reduced. This analysis suggests that demands for
the elimination of control premiums, and the suggestions that control is a
corporate asset, are based on a profound misapprehension concerning the
relationship among, and the interests of, the shareholders.
There are important business relationships in which parties explicitly bargain for the "right" amount of fiduciary obligation. Such bargaining occurs in transactions in which long-term business arrangements are
created by contract under which the parties share the gains from cooperative activity. Agreements creating such relationships have been called
"relational contracts."
A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to
even when the contingencharacterize complex adaptations adequately 24
cies themselves can be identified in advance.
Arrangements of this kind include distributorships, franchises, and exclusive dealing arrangements, such as output and requirements contracts,
all of which contemplate the sharing of the benefits of coordinated behavior over a period of years.
For example, in an exclusive dealing contract, a manufacturer may
agree to sell its entire output to a distributor who agrees to purchase all
of its requirements from the manufacturer. The price set in the agreement is a means of allocating to each the gains from their joint activities.
The parties have created a business firm in which their respective returns
24 Goetz & Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981).
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are dependent on their joint efforts and are subject to some risks which
cannot be identified in advance. A serious risk is that under changed
conditions the arrangement may become very profitable to one and unprofitable to the other.
This problem is often dealt with by a number of provisions in the
contract. There may be a price adjustment clause so that if the supplier's
costs change significantly, the price will be adjusted. Also, each party
will agree to use its "best efforts" to further there purposes of the venture-the buyer to have requirements and the supplier to maintain output. This is a fiduciary obligation in which the precise degree of effort
required is not clear. Best efforts may require a party to incur some
losses to continue to perform, but not to bankrupt itself.25 Significantly,
for present purposes, the law expressly acknowledges the right of the parties to modify, by agreement, the usual meaning of the "best efforts obligation." 2 6 These provisions of relational contracts illustrate the party
27
Finally,
autonomy principle which underlies much of contract law.
a
unilatof
form
the
in
provision
such contracts often include a fail-safe
2" This gives the cancelling party the ability to
eral termination clause.
cut its losses if its expectations are not realized.
The same basic problem is often dealt with in debtor-creditor transactions through the use of clauses permitting acceleration, either at will
or upon the occurrence of certain events. In these transactions, as in
those discussed previously, the parties making long-term commitments
have attempted to limit their exposure to risks resulting from unanticipated events.
The role of the courts in interpreting these various fail-safe or lossSee U.C.C. § 2-306 comment 2 (1978); see also Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, 37 N.Y.2d
466, 335 N.E.2d 320, 373 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1975) (output contract did not compel baker to manufacture bread crumbs for full term of contract, absent explicit language to contrary; however, termination of production must be made in good faith).
26 See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) & comment 5 (1978). This section of the code imposes a best-efforts
obligation and acknowledges the parties' right to contract for a different standard. Id. The comment speaks of "reasonable effort and due diligence." Id.; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at
1117 (best efforts offers a plausible way in which the legal rule can allocate unknown risks in advance
of individual bargaining, thereby reducing the uncertainty costs of an imprecise legal standard).
27 The most extensive and explicit recognition of this principle is in Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which throughout defers to party intent by providing that many prescribed rules
are applicable "unless otherwise agreed." See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-303 (1978) (allowing parties to agree
to shift or divide risk or burden contrary to provisions of Code).
28 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 24, at 1134-49, in which difficulties under termination provisions are extensively analyzed. The drafters of the U.C.C. included an excuse clause based on unanticipated contingencies. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). The theory of this provision is that enforcement of
contracts under circumstances to which enforcement would not have been agreed upon or anticipated, is beyond the parties' expectations. Hence, enforcement of the obligation under such unforeseen contingencies amounts to the making of a new contract ex post. The courts have been reluctant
to grant relief under this provision, usually on the ground that the contingency ought to have been
foreseen; hence a kind of negligence liability is imposed. See cases collected in 3 U.C.C. CAS. DIG.,
2615.1-.10 (1985).
25
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limiting arrangements is to limit their use to the intended purposes as
revealed by the dealings between the participants.
The determination of the scope of fiduciary obligations among
shareholders is both similar to and different from the long-term contractual arrangements briefly discussed above. Since the legal life of almost
all stock corporations is perpetual, the problem of changed conditions
affecting the relationship among shareholders is almost certain to arise.
In the foregoing contractual arrangements the period of time contemplated by the parties is invariably specified in the agreement and is usually not longer, and often shorter, than a decade. The most important
difference between the contracting problem in the foregoing instances
and the rights of shareholders, however, concerns the purpose of the arrangement and the conditions under which one party may wish to terminate it. In these contracts, each party has contracted to buy or supply
goods or credit at a fixed or adjustable price, and the purpose of the
limiting clause is to release the supplier or buyer from the commitment
upon the occurrence of unexpected events which make the commitment
seriously disadvantageous. In these arrangements, particular risks are
allocated to one party or the other, and some type of fail-safe clause permits the reallocation of the risks on the occurrence of the triggering
events.

29

The relationship among owners of the same class of stock is significantly different, because this is a contract in which most anticipated and
unanticipated risks and benefits are shared by the participants in proportion to their investments in the enterprise. With respect to the benefits
and risks which the parties intend to share, fiduciary obligations between
shareholders are enforcement devices for implementing the intent of the
parties. As in most private contracting arrangements, the only basis for
imposing obligations on one party or the other is their expressed or implied intention (which may be found in tacit acceptance of reciprocal
obligations imposed by the courts on shareholders in similar situations).
It follows that the courts must be able to limit the scope of fiduciary
obligations in situations where it appears that the parties intended such
limitations. It must be equally plain that the parties may do explicitly
what the courts have found them to have done implicitly in the cases in
which the courts have set limits on the sharing obligations.
The variations in expectations with which we are concerned in discussing the fiduciary obligations of majority or controlling shareholders
concern only sharing expectations; they do not concern transactions in
which all shares are equally treated. The limit-setting problems involve
29 See U.C.C. § 2-303 (1978), which permits parties to sales transactions where risks are allo-

cated to one or the other "unless otherwise agreed ... not only to shift the allocation but also [to]
divide the risk or burden." Id. In sales transactions in which parties are thinking primarily in terms
of price and performance in an arm's length context, sharing of risks is apparently almost never
explicitly done.
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transactions in which there is a basis for claiming that there was no ex
ante expectation of equal sharing.
We have come to recognize that shareholders do not intend to buy
the same package in all incorporated firms. The ex ante expectations of
shareholders in close corporations are now seen to be quite different from
those of investors in publicly traded companies. 30 Fiduciary obligations
should accordingly be regarded as implied contract terms whose content
varies according to circumstances and ultimately depends upon the
shared expectations of the parties. The courts have recognized such circumstantial variations in cases later criticized on the ground that such
tailoring of fiduciary obligations represents a "weakening" of fiduciary
principles. 3 The difficulty has been caused by the uncompromising rhetoric of the fiduciary concept which misleadingly implies that there ought
to be no limitations and suggests that, in this area, in contrast to the rules
in other areas of commercial law, the law, not the parties, determines the
substantive content of contractual obligations.
When the courts import substantive obligations into private contracts, those obligations are certain to differ to some extent from those
the parties themselves would have made. The degree of divergence will,
of course, vary. When this divergence is small, the parties have little to
gain by negotiating to modify or avoid the impact of the law-created
term; the greater the divergence, the greater the incentive. Bargaining is
costly, and the parties may be expected to engage in it only when the
prospective benefits exceed the costs. In resolving disputes ex post, the
30 The difference between the relationships and expectations of shareholders in close corporations and those of shareholders in publicly held companies is increasingly being explicitly recognized
in the case law. For a discussion of cases recognizing this difference see infra, notes 56-60 and
accompanying text.
31 Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956), the famous divisible corporate
opportunity case, provides an interesting context in which to discuss the balancing concept with
respect to fiduciary obligations. The president of a company which had liquid assets but no active
business received in his personal capacity a lucrative business opportunity, a portion of which he
gave to the corporation. Id. at 482, 121 A.2d at 922. (There was a business reason for dividing the
opportunity.) The division was sustained. Id. at 493, 121 A.2d at 927. The correctness of the result
is indicated by asking the following questions: Would the president, who was a well-known financier, have been willing to agree in advance to give all business opportunities which came to him to
this one firm? (He was involved in numerous businesses.) Would the shareholders in this company
have been better off under an ex ante rule which required that all such opportunities be given to the
firm? See also in this regard Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967), where directors, who were
not salaried employees and had engaged in business activities similar to those of the corporation
before it was formed, continued to do so afterward. It was held that, under the circumstances, the
corporation had no claim to other opportunities subsequently developed by the directors. One commentator, arguing that more fiduciary obligations are better for shareholders, has criticized the result
in Burg. See Note, PropertyAcquired by Directorsof Close Corporation For Their Own Benefit Held
Not to Be a CorporateOpportunity, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187 (1968); see also A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS
& S. SIEGEL, CORPORATIONS 491 (2d ed. 1982) (suggesting that the result in both Johnston and
Burg, effectively holding that directors who serve on boards of other corporations engaged in similar
businesses owe a "reduced" duty to each corporation, "does not seem very satisfactory from a policy
point of view").
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efficiency and productivity of exchange transactions would be enhanced
if the courts sought the allocation which the parties would have made ex
ante had they then considered that the gains of bargaining exceeded the
costs.
Finally, recognition of the properly dominant role of party autonomy in corporation law, as in other commercial law subjects, does not
necessarily lead to a wilderness of complex factual variations. Shareholder expectations are remarkably uniform, and the situations in which
they vary are quite well defined. Closely and publicly held companies are
the two basic prototypes. In the following discussion, a contractual
party-expectation analysis is applied to a number of familiar majorityminority conflict problems. The effort is to show that this approach is
more useful in predicting the results which the courts have often reached
than is the conventional law-imposed fiduciary doctrine.
A.

Close Corporations

The problem in close corporation cases almost invariably is that, in
one way or another, the majority has substantially or totally excluded the
minority from sharing economic benefits generated by the business, while
retaining and employing the minority's investment in the firm. The minority's exposure to "oppressive," Le., unexpected, conduct by the control group in close corporations is directly related to the absence of a
market for the company's stock. Successful operation of a publicly held
firm is, of course, reflected in the market price for its stock, and the control group therefore enhances its own wealth by policies which increase
stock prices. Hence, the minority cannot be excluded from some of the
benefits of profitable operation. In the absence of a market, the majority
has both an incentive and an opportunity to prevent the minority from
receiving any direct or indirect benefit from successful operations. Accumulation of wealth in the firm does not proportionately increase the
value of its stock to outsiders because of the majority's ability to deny the
minority any direct benefit from the increase. On the other hand, the
majority has no incentive to buy the minority's shares for any price in
excess of the discounted value of that portion of the income allocable to
the minority's investment which the majority is unable to divert to itself
through its control of the enterprise. Within the comfortable limits of
the business judgment rule, the majority can, in effect, use the minority's
investment without paying for it.
Traditional judicial fiduciary duty rhetoric has not been conveniently adaptable to this situation. So long as the firm is profitable, and
salaries and management perks are reasonable by general business standards, and all shares are formally treated alike, there is no basis under
the traditional formulations of fiduciary obligation for judicial intervention. The difficulty is that judicial interference involves matters of policy
concerning control group decisions which are not on their face unlawful.
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Involuntary dissolution statutes 32 were attempts at protecting the
minority, by permitting the dissolution of firms when it became apparent
that those in control were pursuing otherwise lawful policies which adversely affected the interests of the minority without having a similar
effect on the control group. This has proved to be a costly solution to the
problem because it requires individual analysis of each case. Plausible
justifications for the policies and practices adopted by the majority,
under most circumstances, must be sorted out to avoid unwarranted interference with the majority's legitimate managerial prerogatives. Additionally, there was and is a perceived danger of permitting the minority
to interfere with effective management, a practice once considered to be
contrary to a state policy requiring majority rule. 33 This policy has been
rejected by legislative enactments which implicitly recognize the contractual nature
of close corporations by permitting departures from majority
34
rule.
It is unusual for the parties in closely held corporations to alter the
usual majority rule, single class of stock format. 35 When a dispute subsequently arises, the judicial problem in these cases is to find a basis for
imposing a "fair sharing" obligation on the group in control. The difficulty with this approach is that the initial mutual understanding and expectation of the parties, which was that there would be an equitable
sharing of burdens and benefits, has broken down, usually as a result of
disagreements over policy, failure of all parties to participate in the business as originally anticipated, or other unforeseen or at least unanticipated events. 36 The close corporation is a joint venture, that is, a longterm relational contract which contemplates that each participant will
contribute capital or services and that proceeds will be equitably shared.
Control is conceded to the majority shareholders because of their larger
investment or special competence, and it is contemplated that control
would be used to protect the majority's larger exposure to risk of loss,
32 See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30 (1984). For a comprehensive discussion of
involuntary dissolution statutes, see 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.28 (1971 & Cum.
Supp. 1986).
33 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
34 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 7.27, 10.21, 10.22 (1984).

35 Studies have found that special contractual arrangements permitted by close corporation
statutes are very infrequently used. Karjala, A Second Look at Special Close CorporationLegislation,
58 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1266 n.236 (1981); see also Blunk, Analyzing Texas Articles of Incorporation:
Is the Statutory Close CorporationFormat Viable?, 34 Sw. L.J. 941 (1980) (in a sample of 1033 close
corporation filings, special statutory close corporation options were used only 37 times).
36 Frequently, the event is the death of one of the active participants in the business. The
remaining active participants then find themselves sharing the result of their efforts with a passive
and sometimes obstructive investor. An example is the leading New York case, In re Radom &
Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (dissolution inappropriate where stock held
equally by two hostile parties but business flourishing). The partnership form provides for the solution of this problem through the automatic dissolution of the partnership upon the death of a partner. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(4) (1914).
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not that it would be used to take advantage of shareholders with smaller
investments.
If the close corporation is regarded as a legal vehicle designed to
implement such an understanding among the parties, a number of remedial alternatives become clearly visible and distinguishable. First, a party
who fails to protect himself against the possibility of a breakdown of the
mutual understanding can be left to bear the consequences of that oversight. Second, rights can be allocated among the parties on the basis of
fault in bringing about the breakdown of the original understanding.
Third, without assigning fault, the withdrawal of a disappointed participant could be permitted on the basis of a finding that the common understanding no longer exists. The choice among these views is a familiar
contracts problem. The first possibility simply treats minority shareholders as parties who made a bad bargain. The second choice attempts to
allocate the risk on the basis of fault in the abrogation of the tacit understanding about benefit sharing. The third possibility imports a termination clause similar to those commonly found in long-term relational
contracts, such as franchise agreements and loan agreements, and sometimes supplied by the law when unforeseen events make performance of
an obligation "commercially impracticable." 3 7
Imposition on the majority of an obligation to exercise its managerial prerogatives in furtherance of an assumed initial understanding that
the benefits of the business would be equitably shared seems a reasonable
rule when compared with the opposite. It is unlikely that the parties
would have agreed, had they addressed explicitly the issue at the outset,
that in the event of disagreement the majority should have the right to
exclude the minority from the profits of the business.
The risk that the common expectation of participants in close corporations will be disappointed differs in three respects from similar risks
facing buyers of stock in publicly held companies. In the first place, the
risk of managerial shirking in publicly held corporations is taken into
account in the purchase price.3" The greater the perceived shirking risk,
the greater the discount. (This would lead one to expect a greater discount on the shares of firms which depend primarily on human capital,
such as an advertising agency.) There is a paradox in the market discount on shares of controlled firms: the discount appears to be based on
the fact that the management is exempt from removal because it holds a
controlling position in the stock. But what if there is a single controlling
shareholder? Such an owner has the incentive and ability to prevent or
reduce managerial shirking and thereby make all shareholders better off.
Why, then, the discount? The answer is that the controlling shareholder
37 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). The courts have had great difficulty with this provision and have
been reluctant to grant relief under it. For further discussion of U.C.C. § 2-615, see supra note 28
and accompanying text.
38 For a related discussion of self-interest as a spur to managerial diligence in closely held
corporations, see supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
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has an incentive to appropriate as much as possible of the savings created
by her supervision of management and little reason to share such gains
with the noncontrolling shareholders. The position of the noncontrolling
public shareholders resembles that of the minority of a closely held firm,
except that there is a public market for their stock. The reason the market price for the noncontrolling public shareholders' stock is lower than
it would be for the stock of a comparable firm in which there is no controlling stockholder, is the ability of the controlling shareholder of the
publicly held firm, like her counterpart in the close corporation, to extract gains which are not shared with the minority shareholders. To the
extent that the controlling shareholder in a publicly held firm does not
fully exploit her position, she is acting benevolently toward the noncontrolling shareholders.
Second, buyers of shares in publicly traded, majority controlled
firms can and presumably do, reduce their exposure to the risk of managerial or majority abuses by holding diversified portfolios. Minority
shareholders in closely held firms are much less likely to be in a position
to do this, since such firms are often organized and launched by individuals with limited resources. Further, the control group in a publicly
traded firm is to some extent restrained in exploiting its controlling position by the risk of an outside takeover if it holds less than a majority of
the shares.3 9 Even a majority control group may be to some extent constrained in exploiting its position by reporting requirements and the attendant risk of litigation. Any control group in such a firm has an
incentive to adopt policies which cause its stock to perform well in the
market if it is considering selling its own stock or raising additional
capital.
The third difference between close corporation stockholders and
owners of stock in publicly held companies is directly related to the considerations previously discussed. Owners of stock in publicly held companies rely on management's self-interest, market forces, and general
principles of corporation law to induce management to operate the firm
in their interest. Participants in closely held firms expect the controlling
group to seek to promote the wealth of the firm because of their own
interests, and they look to the assumed shared understanding and mutual
interests to assure that they will share proportionately in the success of
the firm. This suggested implicit mutual understanding appears to be
finding recognition in case law," in the call for an expectations analysis
of disputes in close corporations,4 and in the language of the statutes
39 For a discussion of related inducements such as self-interest and risk of removal as methods
of heightening managerial diligence, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40 A good example appears in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 298-99, 307 S.E.2d 551,
563 (1983), noted in 20 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 505 (1984).
41 For a perceptive analysis, see Hillman, The DissatisfiedParticipantin the Solvent Business

Venture: A Considerationof the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67
MINN. L. REv. 1, 75-86 (1982).
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under which shareholders may petition for involuntary dissolution.4 2
Typically, "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" acts by those in control are
the grounds upon which such relief may be sought.4 3 Illegality and fraud
are terms with relatively clear legal meanings and include violations of
statutory requirements and misappropriations of corporate assets. To
have any independent meaning, "oppressive" must refer to conduct not
embraced by either of these terms. Occasionally, its meaning is elaborated upon. For example, the New Jersey statute provides in part that a
dissolution suit may be brought where "those in control ...have acted
oppressively or unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in
their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers or employees."' Unfairness and oppression can only be given concrete meaning by reference
to the explicit or implicit ex ante understanding of the parties and reasonable expectations based upon that understanding. These statutes can
reasonably be viewed as treating the corporation as a vehicle through
which the participants seek to implement an understood sharing arrangement in the operation of a business enterprise. Under these statutes, a
transaction brought about by those in control which benefits only the
control group or adversely affects only the noncontrolling shareholders
may be the basis for rescission of the agreement, which takes the form of
dissolution of the corporation. These statutes are relevant only to closely
held firms, the only incorporated firms in which such a contractual understanding is likely to be present or necessary to protect the expectations of investors.45
Three Massachusetts cases illustrate judicial responsivity to the
problems arising from one party's repudiation of the implicit equitable
sharing expectation. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the majority
had caused the corporation to repurchase that portion of its stock not
needed to maintain control. The majority was subsequently required to
cause the corporation to buy back the minority's stock at the same price
on the same terms, thus terminating the jointly owned firm. Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home Inc.,4' the second case, involved four equal
shareholder-directors of a closely held corporation, one of whom was denied equal treatment with the others, contrary to past practices, as a result of a disagreement. On the surface, there was no reason to question
the exercise of the discretionary authority to determine who should be
employed to render services to the corporation. The court implicitly rec42 For a discussion of involuntary dissolution statutes, see supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
43 MODEL BUSINESs CORP. Acr § 14.30(2)(ii) (1984).
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-7(1)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1986).
45 On its face, the applicable Model Act provision applies to all corporations. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2)(ii) (1984). The New Jersey statute applies to corporations with fewer
than 26 shareholders. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-7(1)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1986).
46 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
47 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
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ognized, however, that the corporation was a device by which the four
individuals had contemplated sharing in the operation and benefits of a
jointly owned business. Accordingly, the court held that the fourth
member could not be excluded by the other three. The court said that
the three members comprising the majority "breached their fiduciary
duty to Wilkes as a minority stockholder." 4 Finally, in the third case, a
minority shareholder was held personally liable for using his contractedfor power to block corporate action in a manner which subjected the firm
to unnecessary and avoidable tax liability.49 The court found that the
defendant abused his power to veto corporate action, a power presumably given him to enable him to protect his investment against business
decisions which he considered ill-advised, and perhaps to protect against
the possibility of oppressive conduct by his associates, where such conduct was indisputably contrary to their common economic interest as
shareholders. 50
The feature common to all three cases is that the defendants subsequently used their voting power to promote their own interest to the detriment of other participants. The courts imposed liability in such
situations by finding a duty not to employ one's voting power, either as a
shareholder or as a director, inconsistently with the purposes for which
the power was originally agreed to. In other words, the defendants in
each case had breached an implied understanding.
In other situations, the courts have concluded that the original sharing understanding was modified by subsequent events. For example, if
the business was initially undercapitalized and only one of the participants was willing to make additional contributions, the courts have
found that the parties by their conduct have implicitly agreed to a modification of the initially contemplated sharing of benefits understanding.5 "
Conversely, where the corporation has been immediately and unexpectedly successful, it is exploitative for some shareholders to cause additional shares to be issued to themselves at the initial offering price, even
though the
parties had originally contemplated that such shares would be
2
5

issued.

The similarity between these problems and those arising in relational contracts is obvious. In both situations, a long-term business relationship has been created on unstated assumptions concerning the future
course of events. Difficulties arise when events other than those contemplated occur or when one participant uses her managerial prerogatives to
promote her own interest at the expense of the interests of the others.
48 Id. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
49 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
SO Itappeared that the shareholder whose veto exposed the corporation to the tax liability was
motivated by personal dislike and perhaps the desire to avoid additional personal income tax. Id. at
202, 422 N.E.2d at 800, 803.
51 Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 658 P.2d 1071 (1983).
52 Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946).
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The courts have resolved these disputes under the rubric of fiduciary
duty. The difficulty with this approach is that law-imposed fiduciary obligations are a crude and unpredictable tool for this analysis; 3 in fact, the
heart of the matter, as in contracts and exchange transactions generally,
is party intent, expressed and implied. These situations differ from contracts calling for immediate or short-term performances because of the

higher risk that unforeseen contingencies may make performance disastrous for one party, a difficulty which they share with relational

contracts.
The approach suggested here is in effect a revival and extension of
an argument rejected by older cases which held that parties could not be
partners as between themselves and an incorporated firm at the same
time. 4 Frequently, the issue in such cases was whether the prior joint
53 Lash v. Lash Furniture Co., 130 Vt. 517, 296 A.2d 207 (1972). In Lash, three brothers
owned equally all the outstanding shares of a corporation which held a right of first refusal to buy
the shares of any one of them who wished to sell. Id at 519, 296 A.2d at 209. One shareholder who
had agreed to buy the stock of another in order to acquire control voted as a director against the
corporation's exercising the option. Id. Since the selling shareholder abstained, this action prevented the corporation from exercising the option. In a lawsuit brought by the third shareholder
challenging the corporate decision not to exercise the option, the court held that by blocking the
corporation's exercise of its purchase option, the shareholder who had arranged to buy the shares
himself had violated his duty to consider the repurchase transaction solely "from the standpoint of
benefit to the corporation." Id at 521, 296 A.2d at 210. The court said that this shareholder had
violated his "duty to decide the question on the basis of property corporate policy." Id. There was
no showing that the corporation was in any way adversely affected by its failure to exercise the
option. In fact, it may well have been in a stronger financial position because this decision prevented
its capital from being depleted. The only party who was adversely affected by the refusal was the
shareholder who was deprived of a share of control as a result of the purchase by the second shareholder. A realistic analysis and justification of the result can be made only in terms of some obligation owed to this shareholder. A plausible basis for such an obligation is an understanding that the
brothers contemplated equal shares in the enterprise and that the corporate repurchase option was
designed to implement this understanding if one shareholder wished to withdraw from the firm. It
would follow that the two brothers ought not to be able to alter this arrangement to the detriment of
the third without his consent. A discussion of duties to the corporation in this context could lead
either to liability or nonliability and is analytically meaningless.
54 Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910) (property of corporation formed under
agreement with express intent to carry on business as partnership cannot be taken under control by
court of equity for purposes of dissolution); Weisman v. Awnair Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 444, 144 N.E.2d
415, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1957) (not possible for individual to carry on a joint venture through the
instrumentality of a corporation). This view survives in some states. See Johns v. Caldwell, 601
S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. App. 1980) (close corporation treated as such by court despite plaintiff's argument
that intent of organizing parties was to work as partnership); see also Boss v. Boss, 98 R.I. 146, 200
A.2d 231 (1964) (director-shareholders of corporation owe no fiduciary duty as stockholders to act
in corporation's best interest by voting to refuse to purchase stock which they were personally interested in buying). This problem could be solved by issuing all of the stock in the corporation to the
participants as co-partners. The stock would then be a partnership asset. The participants' respective interest in the partnership and its assets could then be set forth in the partnership agreement.
The parties would then have the benefit of the mutual fiduciary obligations provided in partnership
law, as well as the unilateral right of partner to terminate the partnership. In general, it appears that
special control arrangements in close corporations are not an area of business organizations law
which has received the benefit of imaginative or creative lawyering.
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venture agreement survived the subsequent formation of the corporation.
Now that it is clear under both statutes 55 and case law5 6 that participants
in close corporations can alter the standard hierarchical management
structure of stock corporations, the earlier view-holding that joint venture arrangements could not survive the formation of the corporationshould be rejected, as it has been in more recent cases. 7
The view suggested here builds on that development. It simply assumes that parties who form closely held firms intend an equitable sharing of returns. It may be expected that those in control will take
reasonable compensation for managerial services and that their views will
prevail when there are disagreements over policy; but, it assuredly is not
the common understanding that, in the event of serious disagreement,
they would be free to use their managerial prerogatives to exclude the
minority from sharing in gains generated by the business.
Such an implicit sharing understanding, it is suggested, is really
what underlies the working-out of the duties imposed on the majority in
Donahue and Wilkes. The Donahue and Wilkes recognition of this obligation does not break new ground or invade the majority's managerial

prerogatives. In essence, the implied understanding requires the same
inquiry that is involved under the involuntary dissolution statutes which
permit the court to order dissolution because of "oppressive" conduct by

those in control. The notion of an implicit understanding concerning
sharing of gains gives a meaning to the term "oppressive" which is peculiar to the close corporation situation with which these statutes are exclusively concerned. It is oppressive for the majority to run the business
efficiently and profitably while excluding the minority from the resulting
gains. The courts have had no difficulty identifying such conduct in de55

E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1982).
56 See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
57 Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 177 Ind. App. 224, 378 N.E.2d 941 (1978) (evidence
sustained finding that parties intended equal ownership and control of "incorporated partnerships");
DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955) (partner's claim of breach against two other
partners allowed where partners agreed to undertake joint venture under corporate form, then together voted to amend charter to allow increase in capital stock); McDonald v. McDonald, 53 Wis.
2d 371, 192 N.W.2d 903 (1972) (where corporate form used as instrumentality of partnership, form
should be disregarded upon dissolution); see also Hallahn v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 70,
385 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (1979) ('Within... a [close] corporation the principal stockholders owe to
each other and minority shareholders the rigorous fiduciary duty of partners and participants in a
joint venture"). For a critical review of New York's rejection of the joint venture approach, see
Conway, The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships and Joint Ventures, 30
FORDHAm L. REv. 297 (1961). A tacit understanding of equal sharing underlies the result in a later
New York case in which one faction in a corporation whose shares were held equally by two families
caused additional shares to be issued to themselves. Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d
334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975). In sending the case back for trial, the court of appeals held that the
board of directors owed a "fiduciary duty" to the complaining shareholder not to disturb "the equality of the two-family ownership" and indicated that in order to sustain the transaction the board
would have to show compelling reasons for doing so. Id. at 493, 335 N.E.2d at 338-39, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 128.
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ciding cases under these statutes. Such explicit recognition of the implied contractual basis of the duties imposed on those in control invites
the parties to bargain explicitly over these matters, by indulging a presumption of equitable sharing in the absence of contrary agreement.
Once it is clear that the law will seek to imply, or will construct, such an
understanding based on the dealings among the participants, the parties
may be induced to make their understandings more explicit, and even to
make advance arrangements for the possibility of disagreement, perhaps
in the form of a dissolution or buy-out arrangement.
The remedial statutes adopted in many states give courts discretion
to grant or withhold relief. These statutes have varied in the degree of
discretion courts have been given to devise remedies to fit particular
cases. Under the older statutes the only power given to the court was to
grant or deny dissolution.5 8 The newest statutes grant a wide array of
remedies. The Minnesota statute, for example, enumerates fifteen remedies which, in effect, permit the court to assume full control of the business.59 These statutes follow a pattern that has become familiar in other
fields, notably the area of civil rights, in which the courts have undertaken to supervise the operation of school systems in order to assure
compliance with the law. In commercial and business organizations law,
such a broad and general legislative delegation to the courts of on-going
control over the internal affairs and property of private firms occurs only
when a firm is unable to pay its debts. It is highly unlikely that the
participants, had they addressed the question ex ante, would have opted
for such a potentially cumbersome and costly solution. 6' Once a dispute
has arisen, however, the disadvantaged party would welcome the availability of any statutory scheme which would be useful in negotiating a
more advantageous outcome than is otherwise available.
The courts in recent years have shown an increasing willingness to
59 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (1984). The model act provision on this point is
unchanged from prior versions. See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97(a) (1980).
59 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 1985).

60 The writer is one of the commentators who continues to think that a simpler, easier, selfexecuting solution, such as a statutory buy-out right, would provide the same advantages at less cost
to the parties, the judicial system, and the economy. A discussion supporting this approach is
presented in Herington & Dooly, Illiquidy and Exploitation: A ProposedSolution to the Remaining
Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REv. I (1977). It has been suggested that an advantage of the
discretionary approach is that it avoids the loss to the economy resulting from the liquidation of
viable firms and that a serious disadvantage of a mandatory buy-out-or-liquidate rule is that it may
result in such loss. Hence, it is said that the buy-out solution "would often be unworkable and could
be inequitable" while it is "highly improbable" that discretionary remedies" will have the effect of
depriving the community of a viable business." Olson, A Statutory Elixirfor the OppressionMalady,
36 MERCER L. Rlv. 627, 634, 643 (1985). Usually, as in this example, no authorities are cited for
these propositions. In the cases examined by Professor Dooley and this writer, there was no example
of a "viable business" being destroyed by dissolution. Typically, the parties promoted their mutual
economic interests through a buy-out whether dissolution was ordered or not. Nor did we find any
more reason to conclude that buy-outs were any more "unworkable" than cancellation or rescission
of contracts.
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sustain unanimous contracts among shareholders in close corporations
which significantly alter the standard statutory management structure.6 1

These cases implicitly recognize the contractual basis of the incorporated
business enterprise and take the logical step of validating explicit contractual arrangements made by the parties to promote their joint interests
and to manage their potentially conflicting interests. On the other hand,
the courts have persisted in scrutinizing and limiting the enforceability of
non-unanimous agreements among shareholders. Generally, such agreements are valid so long as they are limited to voting for the board of
directors, as in the famous Ringling6 2 case. However, where the agreement extends to the control of managerial decisions by the board, these
agreements continue to be struck down, primarily on the ground that
they infringe the rights of the non-participating shareholders. 63 This result is consistent with the thesis of the present discussion because such
non-unanimous agreements are invariably entered into some time after
the formation of the corporation, and insofar as such agreements attempt
to control management policy, they are likely to be inconsistent with the
ex ante expectations of the non-participants. Even a Ringling-type arrangement to some extent adversely affects the interest of the non-participating shareholder, because it forecloses the possibility of her forming a
coalition with one of the parties to the agreement. However, since the
possibility of an agreement among the members of a share-voting coalition was present from the beginning, the courts have considered this a
risk that the non-participant should be deemed to have agreed to take.
Non-unanimous agreements on matters of corporate policy which detrimentally affect the non-participating shareholder are another matter, and
the courts have been unwilling to consider that such arrangements were
within the implied bargain made by the minority investor.
61 Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Pohn v. Diversified Industries, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Henderson v. Joplin, 191 Neb. 827, 217
N.W.2d 920 (1974); Adler v. Svingos, 80 A.D.2d 764, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1981); Zion v. Kurtz, 50
N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1980); Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136
S.E.2d 569 (1964) (all upholding agreements by shareholders to conduct affairs of corporation in
manner contrary to standard).
62 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53

A.2d 441 (1947).
63 This view is settled law in New York. Triggs v. Triggs, 46 N.Y.2d 305, 385 N.E.2d 1254,
413 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1978) (provisions of tan agreement between principal shareholders affecting election and compensation of officers illegal since not all shareholders were party to agreement) (dictum); Christal v. Petry, 275 A.D. 550, 90 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1949) (agreement between two principal
shareholders to reduce statutorily designated number of directors and select all directors held invalid), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 562, 93 N.E.2d 450 (1950); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 A.D. 918, 77 N.Y.S.2d
682 (1948) (contract between principal stockholders for distribution of corporate property held invalid on grounds corporation and other shareholders were not parties to contract); see also Glazer v.
Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967). Non-unanimous agreements
affecting policy which do not differentially affect the minority may receive favorable treatment. See
generally Comment, "Shareholders'Agreements"and the StatutoryNorm, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 68, 7476 (1957).
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The difference in the judicial treatment of unanimous and non-unanimous agreements follows from the thesis of the present discussion.
Unanimous agreements are likely to have been made at the outset, or if
entered into subsequently are a revision of the original understanding to
which all parties consent. Non-unanimous agreements are invariably the
result of a subsequent alignment among the participants, usually on the
basis of an intervening disagreement with the non-participants. Such
agreements are almost certain to be inconsistent with the reasonable ex
ante expectations of the non-participating shareholders. As unilateral
coalitions among some shareholders which affect the non-participant's
investment, nonunanimous agreements may be struck down if there are
ex post changes in the terms of that investment which adversely affect its
value.
B.

Elimination of Public Shareholders in Publicly Held Firms

The state of the law that emerges from the more recent cases on this
subject is that the controlling shareholder in a publicly held firm may
force the minority to sell its shares at a "fair" price. The requirement
that such transactions have a business purpose, apart from the interest of
the control group in eliminating the minority, has been explicitly abandoned or severely eroded." 4 Full disclosure of information relevant to
the determination of the value of the stock is required, and there may be
judicial review of the valuation. This much discussed, and often deplored, state of the law is the converse of the usual problem of minority
shareholders in closely held firms whose usual complaint is that their
investment is retained in the business while they are excluded from sharing in present and prospective returns generated by the firm. The remedy
frequently sought for this situation is a forced buy-out by the majority at
a price which fairly reflects the minority's pro rata share of the value of
the firm. Forced buy-outs are the solution in the close corporations and
the problem in publicly held companies. The behavior of close corporation minorities in seeking this form of relief points to the obvious conclusion that it is better from the investor's standpoint to sell out, provided
there is a reasonable assurance of price fairness, than to be locked in
while being deprived of earnings generated by one's investment. 5 In
64 Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (upholding "freeze-out" merger of minority's
acres in subsidiary corporation, directors of which were also directors of purchasing parent corporation; remanded to determine fair market value of shares); see also Laird v. ICC, 691 F.2d 147 (3d
Cir. 1982) (railway's elimination of minority shareholders' support system deemed proper purpose
for reverse stock split), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487
(Del. 1982) (invalidating "freeze-out" merger for defendant's failure to establish business purpose for
merger other than freeze-out); Cross v. Communication Channels, Inc., 116 Misc. 2d 1019, 456
N.Y.S.2d 971 (1982) (invalidating "freeze-out" by which controlling shareholder sought to "go private"; legitimate business purposes established).
65 Of course, the majority shareholder in a close corporation would pay some price for the
minority's stock, but not a price which reflects is proportionate share of the value of the firm.
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both publicly held and close corporations, the sale itself produces costs
for which there may not be full compensation, e.g., the seller is subjected
to immediate tax liability and may incur search costs in finding a new
investment. There may also be a loss of idiosyncratic value if the shareholder values the particular investment for reasons apart from its economic value.
The forced liquidation of a stockholder's investment may be characterized in various ways. It has been called private eminent domain,6 6 a
label which implies that such a forced sale is or should be improper. The
forced taking of one person's property by another, even at a fair price, is
a substantial invasion of property ownership rights. As applied to almost
any form of property other than an investment security, a forced taking
would be unacceptable. But investment securities are a peculiar form of
property, as a contractual analysis shows. Majority shareholders have
traditionally been able to force changes in the minority's investment and
even to force a sale of the investment, through mergers and sales of assets
approved by majority vote. The effect of a squeeze-out on the minority is
exactly the same. However, the identity of the purchaser is important
because of its effect on the majority's incentive. Where the business is
being sold to a third party, the majority has an incentive to negotiate the
best possible price; where the majority itself is the purchaser, its incentive
is the opposite.
In contract terms, the situation of the public shareholder under the
present state of the law can be described as follows: the buyer of stock in
a publicly held corporation purchases an interest in the company's future
income, subject to the possibility that because of circumstances over
which she will have no control she may be forced to sell at a price which
fairly reflects its then value. One of the circumstances under which such
a forced liquidation may occur is the sale of the stock to a person who
has assembled a controlling position in the company. Such a controlling
shareholder may force such a sale whenever she concludes that her
wealth would be enhanced by eliminating public investors in the enterprise. In analyzing this aspect of corporation law, the initial question is
not whether such a forced sale of private property should be permitted; it
is whether buyers of stock in publicly held companies should be permitted to make contracts containing this provision. The answer to this question ought to turn, at least initially, on whether buyers of stock would
wish to make such a contract. If they would, then the question becomes
whether there is a reason they should not be permitted to do so, because
it appears, judging from the behavior of investors in the market, that they
do not regard such contracts as undesirable.
Ex ante, there is no reason for public shareholders to object to this
provision, because it enhances the value of their investment by increasing
66

Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv.

1189, 1191 (1964).
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the number of potential bidders for their stock. In view of the fact that
repurchase prices in decided cases have always been substantially higher
than the then prevailing market prices, there seems to be little reason to
think, despite the possibility of undiscovered values being appropriated
by insider purchasers, that buyers of stock would object to this rule. The
probabilities are that this rule increases the value of their stock and
should, therefore, increase the attractiveness of publicly offered equities
to rational wealth maximizers.
Rules enabling minority shareholders to challenge buy-outs under a
business purpose test or other rules permitting an inquiry into the buyer's
motives reduce the value of the investments of all shareholders in publicly held companies by increasing the difficulty (and thereby reducing
the frequency) of attempted buy-outs by insiders. Any rule which
reduces the aggregate demand for shares held by the public, therefore,
reduces their value.
A rule which enables individual shareholders to obstruct such transactions gives rise to the problem that made the old unanimity rule for
mergers and sales of assets unworkable, i.e., the last shareholder whose
approval was required could capture a disproportionate share of the gain
by holding out. The possibility of strategic behavior arises whenever one
party stands to lose less from blocking a transaction than another. In
such a situation, there is a temptation for the individual with blocking
power to coerce a side payment for permitting the transaction to proceed.
This suggests that there are serious efficiency costs in permitting minorities to obstruct reorganization transactions and that these risks arise
whenever the minority is given rights which enable it to demand more
than the "fair" value of its shares as a condition for its consent to a
reorganization transaction. As has been demonstrated by Professor Easterbrook and Fischell, a rule which requires gains from reorganization
transactions to be equally shared among all shareholders, thereby denying controlling shareholders a premium for their control position, will
decrease the frequency of such transactions, interfere with the movement
of corporate resources to more highly valued uses, and reduce the aggregate wealth of all shareholders.6 7
There has been some demand by academic writers that investors
should be protected against (that is, should not be permitted to make)
investment contracts containing the provisions which have grown up
under present law as described above. Of course, the state may restrict
or prohibit contracts which, for sufficient reason, are found to be inimical
to public or private welfare. However, as long as sellers are permitted to
offer investment contracts with differing features and buyers can decline
to purchase if the combination of features of the particular investment
contract seems disadvantageous as compared with other available opportunities, the fact that some observers disapprove of the terms of some of
67
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the investment contracts being traded in the market does not make a case
for proscribing them. In corporations, as in contract law generally, the
substantive content of exchange transactions can in the first instance be
left to the participants and intervention reserved for situations in which it
appears that the reasonable expectations of the participants are being
frustrated.
C. Parent-SubsidiaryRelationships
Initially it seems plain that the responsibilities of a parent corporation to the minority shareholder in a partially owned subsidiary are the
same as those owed by any other majority shareholder to the minority in
a publicly held firm. There are, however, some important practical differences. In discussing the obligations of the majority to the minority up
to this point, this article has dealt with the sharing of gains generated by
the corporation in which the majority and minority were stockholders
and with the power of the majority to compel the liquidation of the minority's investment in the firm. It made no difference in these situations
whether the controlling shareholder was itself a corporation or not.
Two types of problems, however, arise primarily or solely in the parent-subsidiary situation. The first concerns corporate opportunities.
Where the two corporations operate related businesses, there may be a
problem in allocating business opportunities between them. This is a
standard corporate opportunity problem. Parent-subsidiary conflicts are
often factually more difficult than those in which management seeks to
take for itself an opportunity arising from the business of the firm it is
managing: in the parent-subsidiary situation, each corporation may have
a plausible claim to the opportunity based on its relationship to each
corporation's existing business. The management of the parent owes its
shareholders an obligation to permit the subsidiary to take no more than
it is entitled to take under the law. The problems are similar to those
that arise when the parent and the subsidiary do business with each
other. In such cases, the permissible terms of such a transaction are
those that would result from arms' length bargaining.6"
The allocation of gains and losses arising directly from the control
relationship itself poses a different problem. Most of the reported litigation concerns the allocation of tax savings resulting from the fact that
parent corporations and their eighty percent-owned subsidiaries may file
68 Where a parent sells to or buys from its partially owned subsidiary, it is clear that it must do
so at a "fair" price. Where the goods bought or sold are traded in an active market, the parentsubsidiary transactions must occur at the open market price. The leading case on parent-subsidiary
transactions is Price v. Standard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1945). Where the transactions are more
complex, such as the operating of the partially owned subsidiary's railroad as a part of the parent's
system, this is not an administrable standard. In such a case, it has been said that objecting minority
shareholders in the subsidiary can prevail only by showing that the terms on which revenues were
shared were outside a zone of reasonableness within which unrelated parties could have contracted.
See Ewen v. Peoria & E.R.R., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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consolidated federal income tax returns. There is no obligation to file
such a return under the Internal Revenue Code.6 9 It would appear, however, that in the absence of a business reason for not doing so, the management of the parent owes an obligation to its shareholders to file a
consolidated return, if doing so would increase their wealth. This obligation follows from the normal expectation of shareholders as residual
claimants that managers will operate the firm so as to benefit their economic interests. From the standpoint of the shareholders of the parent
corporation, the tax saving is a control premium made available by their
collective purchase of eighty percent of the subsidiary's stock. As the
following analysis indicates, however, it is more difficult to discover a
similar expectation and obligation on the parent's management to benefit
the minority shareholders in the subsidiary.7"
Consider first the situation in which the parent's profits are sheltered
from income tax by filing the subsidiary's losses on a consolidated return.
If the parent takes no further action, the minority shareholders in the
subsidiary will get no benefit from the resulting tax savings except to the
extent that it is better to be a minority shareholder in a subsidiary controlled by a wealthier (rather than a less wealthy) parent corporation.
Without the filing of the consolidated tax return, the subsidiary
would have had a tax loss carried forward which would have value,
since, if the subsidiary were sold or merged, the price received by the
selling shareholders would have included some payment for the tax loss
which could be used to shelter the purchaser's future income. It may be
just this tax saving that the parent corporation sought to purchase when
it acquired eighty percent of the subsidiary's stock. There is no obvious
reason why the parties to the purchase and sale transaction would, or
should, anticipate that a gain generated by that transaction would have
to be shared with non-participants. From the minority's standpoint, the
tax saving is truly an accident, the existence of which is wholly dependent on the voluntary conduct of others who, in bringing about this benefit, are in no way obligated or motivated to increase the wealth of the
minority. The parent, on the other hand, has made the tax saving possible through the commitment of resources to the enterprise and may reasonably be assumed to have done so in part to achieve this particular
benefit. On the other hand, minority shareholders are not worse off by
I.R.C. § 1501 (1982).
The argument developed in the text is to some extent anticipated in Note, CorporateFiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-SubsidiaryRelations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964) which argues
that "fairness" as a test of the validity of such transactions has "an inherent bias in favor of the
dominated unit," and that this test "has served principally as a means of rationalizing decisions
against defendant control-groups." Id at 340. The Note writer argues that it would be "more
fruitful to define fairness... in terms of the shareholders' 'expectation' "because this approach leads
to a search for party intent "on their entrance in to the relationship." Id. at 349. "Fairness should
be sought in the degree to which the particular transaction... conformed to the expectations of the
parties, as of the time the relationship was entered into, or perhaps, as of the last time when the
complainant had a realistic chance of ending his participation therein." Id. at 350-51.
69
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being denied a share of such purchase-generated gains; they simply are
not better off. Denying them a share of these gains is unlikely to violate
any of their ex ante expectations as investors. Shareholders look for
gains from the operation of the business. Those accruing solely from
changes in its ownership that do not affect its operations or revenues
should not be considered to be within the range of their legally recognized expectations. Further, purchases of controlling interests in failing
firms are often rather risky investments, and there are obvious policy
reasons for encouraging them. A rule which reduces the incentive to
make such purchases would, to that extent, seem undesirable. On the
other hand, failing to recognize the claim of the minority to participate in
such benefits would not appear to have any adverse behavioral consequences. Finally, it should be noted, if the parent does not have a legal
obligation to share the tax savings with the subsidiary's minority, for it to
do so voluntarily would be a waste of its assets for which its shareholders
should have an action against its management.
The analysis of the converse case, in which filing a consolidated return shelters subsidiary's profits from income tax because of the parent's
losses, leads to a similar result. If the parent takes the entire tax saving,
the minority shareholders are no worse off than they would have been if
they were no parent corporation or if a consolidated return had not been
fied. The claim of the minority to be made better off must be based on
one of two views either that: (1) the parent owed the minority a duty to
cause a consolidated return to be fied, or (2) the parent owed no such
duty but was obligated to share any resulting gain if it elected to file a
consolidated return. The claim of minority shareholders in the subsidiary can only arise from a contractual obligation, express or implied,
quasi-contract, or a fiduciary duty imposed on the parent to the minority.
It seems implausible to suggest that such an obligation would have been
agreed to at the time control was bought by the parent had the issue been
raised. This seems a fairly safe assumption, since neither the parent nor
those from whom it was buying control would have anything to gain
from the creation of such a sharing obligation to benefit a nonparty. Similarly, there appears to be no reason why the nonparticipating minority
shareholder would expect that, in a purchase of control transaction, a
sharing obligation would be considered or agreed to for their benefit.
They would therefore have no reason to attach any value to the possibility that a sharing obligation would be negotiated.
Finally, there is no basis for implying a sharing obligation in favor of
the minority as a matter of law. The usual requirement of quasi-contract
that the claimant have conferred a benefit upon the defendant due to
circumstances under which the law would imply an obligation to pay to
avoid unjust enrichment seems not to be met here, because the minority
shareholders have done nothing to create the benefit of which they demand a share. Nor can they be said to have acted in reliance, reasonable
or otherwise, on an expectation of sharing. Consequently, a judicially
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imposed sharing requirement seems unjustifiable. 7
An expectation model of the corporation, therefore, supports the
conclusion that no such obligation should be imposed. As a matter of
policy and quite apart from party intent and expectations, there are reasons why such an obligation should not be imposed. In terms of the
efficient deployment of assets, the cost of a rule which requires that gains
be shared by those whose activities produce them with those who have
not invested in their production reduces the incentives of the efficient
deployment of resources. If it is correct, as previously suggested, that the
minority shareholders have no expectation of sharing such gains, permitting them to share at the expense of those whose activities produced these
gains simply creates an unnecessary cost of purchasing control. Like any
other such cost, it reduces the incentives to acquire control and, therefore, inhibits the movement of resources to their most highly valued use.
A rule which has this effect is, of course, contrary to the economic inter-

ests of investors.
The results in the cases have been more consistent with the contractual analysis suggested here than with any other. Where a loss has fallen

on the subsidiary because of third party's conduct based on the control

relationship, the parent has not been required to share it.7 2 Where the
result has been a benefit which in the first instance has fallen to the par-

ent, the parent has been allowed to retain it.73 Where the benefit has
initially accrued to the subsidiary, the parent has been allowed to appropriate most of the benefit to itself,74 although some courts have required
some sharing of the benefit in this situation.7 5

71 Generally accepted formulations of quasi-contractual principles are not sufficiently inclusive
to encompass sharing claims on behalf of the subsidiary's minority shareholders in this situation.
See Wade, Restitutionfor Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1212 (1966).
Consequently, the only available basis upon which such a claim must be asserted is an ex ante
contracted exception.
72 Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
73 Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967).
74 Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).
For a discussion justifying the result of Case in terms of shareholder expectations, see Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338, 352-53
(1964) (supporting appellate division's dissenting view, which was subsequently adopted by the court
of appeals).
75 Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 338, 184 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1982); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla.
1963). In Smith, the parent caused the subsidiary to write a check to it for the amount of the tax
saving, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 342, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 573. The court held, as suggested in the text and
contrary to the argument made here, that "[flairness requires a proportionate sharing of the benefit."
Id. at 346, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 575. Had the court followed the analysis argued here and held that the
parent was entitled to the entire saving, a further difficulty would have arisen, with which the argument in the text does not deal. On what theory can the parent instruct the subsidiary to issue a
check for the amount of the saving? Corporations can disburse funds only to pay legal obligations or
dividends, and such a disbursement is neither. In Alliegro, such a payment was held to be an unlawful non-pro rata dividend. Alliegro, 136 So. 2d at 661. It follows that, if the theory argued in the text
were followed, a contract would need to be entered into between the parent and subsidiary. See Case
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CONCLUSION

The thesis of this article can be simply stated. It begins with the
proposition that stock corporations should be viewed as networks of contracts by which persons contribute goods, capital, and services to the enterprise and purchase outputs produced by it. These contracts are
exchange transactions governed generally by contract law. The contracts
made by the purchasers of an equity investment in the firm differ from
those made by others who deal with the corporation because only the
equity purchasers buy interests in the future residual income which the
business is expected to generate. The expectations of others who contract with the firms are protected by contract law, therefore, if the corporation fails to deliver the goods, services, or payments called for in the
agreement, the adversely affected parties have legal remedies and may
ultimately force the firm into insolvency if it fails to perform.
While stock buyers, like others who contract with the firm, have
purchased contract rights, the performance they expect cannot be promised. The firm may or may not succeed, despite the best efforts of those
in control. Under these circumstances, if the buyer is not assured of the
best efforts of managers, she has nothing. Contracts made by stock buyv. New York Cent. R-R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965). The argument
in the text supports the view that an agreement under which the parent takes virtually the entire gain
is "fair".
Commentators have been critical of the results in the cases cited in this and the preceding three
notes. See Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 297, 308-309 (1974), arguing for proportional sharing based on the market prices of shares of
each corporation. Brudney and Chirelstein's view has been criticized as being "devoid of any connection with the relative contributions to the tax saving, [and therefore] entirely haphazard and
arbitrary." Shreiber & Yoran, Allocating the Tax SavingDerivedfrom FilingConsolidatedCorporate
Tax Returns, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 243, 249 (1977). These authors argue for allocation of the entire
tax benefit to the loss subsidiary on the basis of "considerations of economic efficiency" and, in the
reverse case, allocating the entire benefit to the loss parent "for considerations of symmetry." Id. at
253. The basis of this suggestion is that in the loss subsidiary case a rule permitting the parent to
take virtually all the tax saving is inefficient because it gives the parent an incentive to cause the
subsidiary to undertake "projects with a high degree of risk and low expected rate of return." Id. at
252. It is difficult to know how seriously to regard this possibility. It is not clear why any management would want to invest in such projects, quite apart from the considerable risk of suit by the
minority in the subsidiary. Suits against parent corporations by minorities in subsidiaries have considerable nuisance value and have the substantial advantage, as compared with suits by shareholders
against managements generally, of a solvent defendant whose conduct is measured by a strict standard of fairness. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). One of the
"skews" immanagerial incentives which is said to adversely affect the economic incentives of shareholders in publicly held companies is that managers, whose portfolios are generally not diversified,
are excessively risk averse. A recent article on the point is Marcus, Risk Sharingand the Theory of
the Firm, 13 BELL. J. ECON. 369 91982), which suggests that minority shareholders in the subsidiary
may, therefore, not be disadvantaged by some reduction in risk aversion by management. Id. at 377.
There is simply not enough substance in these speculations to justify interference with private ordering. Taken together, the proposals of Brudney and Chirelstein, and Shreiber and Yoran point to the
inappropriateness of having judges or academics make contracts for investors based on their own
visions of fairness and efficiency.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES

ers, therefore, contain a number of explicit and implicit provisions which
together provide some assurance that the management will in fact endeavor to produce net revenues. The most important explicit provision is
that the common shareholders have the collective right to select and remove directors. The most important implicit provision is that managers
are under an obligation to be competent, diligent, and loyal to the economic interests of the common stockholders. The fiduciary duty of managers and of majority shareholders to minority shareholders is derived
from the expectations of the parties to the transaction in which stock is
bought by investors. The reason this obligation follows from the intentions and expectations of the parties in the issuance of common stock,
and from no other transaction between a stock corporation and those
who deal with it (customers and creditors, for example), is the difficulty
of precisely defining the terms of the obligation that the management has
assumed.
This model for deriving the fiduciary obligation of corporate managers and controlling shareholders from the contracts and expectations of
shareholders differs from the conventional legal treatment of fiduciary
obligations, which considers such obligations as being imposed by the
law on managers and controlling shareholders without reference to the
expectations and intentions of the parties. The objection to the traditional derivation and formulation of the fiduciary concepts is that it provides no basis for determining the limits of such obligations. Established
and generally acknowledged limitations on the fiduciary obligations of
managers and controlling shareholders therefore appear to be anomalous, unpredictable, and unprincipled exceptions to fiduciary obligations.
Further, this traditional approach makes no allowance for differing obligations in different settings: specifically, that the content and the direction of fiduciary obligations differs in closely and publicly held firms.
Much of the initial difficulty experienced by courts in close corporation
cases resulted from the fact that shareholders in publicly held firms were
said to owe no obligation to each other, and this notion carried over to
closely held firms.
This article has argued that, if fiduciary obligations are viewed as
rooted in the expectations of the parties, the limitations on the scope of
such obligations can be seen as both principled and logical. Most important, is the fact that the limitations are consistent with the enhancement
of the wealth of shareholders. Equity investors are assumed to be rational wealth maximizers who would seek to have an equal sharing rule
imposed on controlling shareholders only to the extent that such a rule
would enhance their wealth. Ex ante, rational investors would not favor
a rule prohibiting control premiums, because such a rule would be an
obstacle to the transfer of control to persons who are likely to manage
the corporation more efficiently to the benefit of all stockholders. Similarly, experience has shown that ongoing private transactions result in
payments to public shareholders which exceed market prices and prob-
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able prices that could be obtained from other buyers; hence, a rule barring such transactions is not wealth enhancing to investors. Gains
accruing solely to the creation of a parent-subsidiary relationship appear
(so it was argued) not to be within the sharing expectation of minority
shareholders in a subsidiary. Denying shareholders the right to participate pro rata in such gains, as the courts have done, is not inequitable.
The principal that emerges from these examples is that the economic interests of noncontrolling shareholders are enhanced by rules that permit
majority shareholders to engage in some transactions from which they
receive gains that are not shared with noncontrolling shareholders.
In close corporations, the most, indeed the only, plausible assumption concerning the ex ante expectations of the participants is that the
majority would not use its controlling position to exclude the minority
from participation in the earnings of the firm without cause, i.e., unless
the minority ceases to participate in the enterprise as anticipated. The
transactions giving rise to litigation in close corporations have been exploitative: that is, the majority has in fact used its position to appropriate
a disproportionate share of the value of the firm. No efficiency gains
have been involved, and the value of the minority's investment has been
adversely affected. The imposition of liability on controlling shareholders under these circumstances, in effect, implements the implicit ex ante
understanding of the participants.
It is not suggested that recognition of the dependence of fiduciary
obligations on the underlying understandings and expectations of the
parties is an easy and final solution to the problem of allocating gains and
losses among shareholders. It is submitted, however, that this approach
is a more precise and accurate tool for determining the scope of such
obligations and will yield results more consistent with the ex ante intent
of the parties than the uncompromising dogmas which have characterized judicial opinion in this area. This approach is also more consistent
with the central role of party autonomy and intent in commercial law
generally and with the results in cases in which the courts have recognized limits on fiduciary obligations of majority shareholders. One might
even hope that explicit recognition of the contractual basis of these obligations will facilitate bargaining with respect to the scope of these obligations, a practice which traditional doctrine discourages.

